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1.1 Research question 
In bankruptcy proceedings, the general rule is that only the insolvent debtor’s property may 
be liquidated and distributed among the creditors to satisfy their claims. The Norwegian 
Creditors Recovery Act § 2-2 stipulates that creditors may seek satisfaction for their claims in 
assets (“formuesgoder”) that belong to (“tilhører”) the debtor and may be converted into 
money (“kan omgjøres til penger”) by means of sale, lease etc. 
Similarly, the Chinese Enterprise Bankruptcy Law1 article 107 (2) stipulates that “after being 
declared bankrupt, the debtor shall be named the bankrupt, and the debtor’s assets as the 
bankruptcy assets”. Under article 111 (2), the bankruptcy administrator “shall (...) appraise 
and sell insolvent assets at the current price in due course”. The similarity with the 
Norwegian Creditors Recovery Act § 2-2 becomes apparent when considering the Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law article 30, which stipulates that the term “debtor’s assets” refers to all the 
assets “that belong to a debtor” when a bankruptcy application is accepted, in addition to 
assets “obtained by the debtor” throughout the entire bankruptcy proceeding. 
These statutes suggest that the general rule has a positive and a negative facet. First, it 
indicates that generally, the estate may seize any property that belongs to the debtor, making 
the property an insolvent asset. Second, property that does not belong to said debtor may not 
be included in the estate.  
This thesis compares the scope of the bankruptcy estate according to Norwegian and Chinese 
law, with a focus on which movable property the estate may seize to cover creditor claims. 
The topic is vast and many-faceted, the thesis covering it limited in scope, and existing 
comparisons of Norwegian and Chinese property and business law are few. Therefore, I do 
not attempt at covering aspects of ‘debtor’s assets’ in such detail as some of the more 
specialised or lengthy works referenced. Instead, I attempt at providing a general overview as 
                                                
1 In China, the word “法” (“fa”), refers both to the legal area in general and the statutes themselves. Thus, “破产
法” (“pochanfa”) means bankruptcy law in general, and the statutory act it is codified in. Although the common 
nomenclature for statutory law in English is ‘act’, translations of and accounts on Chinese law typically use the 






grounds for a broader comparison between the two jurisdictions. My intention is to provide 
helpful clues for conducting secure commercial transactions across continents, give insight 
into the countries’ legislative attitudes and show indications of undetermined legal questions 
that future comparative studies may investigate further. 
My main research question is as follows:  
Which circumstances determine whether Chinese and Norwegian law consider 
movable property that of the debtor, so that it may be attached to the bankruptcy estate in the 
event of bankruptcy? 
As one cannot transfer a right one does not have (the so-called nemo dat principle),2 the 
creditors normally cannot claim any right that the debtor himself would not have, were he not 
bankrupt. Thus, the rules on when ownership passes from the seller to the buyer are a natural 
starting point for the analysis, and the subject of chapter 3. 
However, the underlying problem is this: Which movables may the estate liquidate to 
distribute the value among creditors? This makes ownership a mere starting point to ascertain 
the estate’s scope, as assets that debtor owns and assets that unsecured creditors may seek 
satisfaction through will often diverge. Therefore, when referring to ‘debtor’s assets’, I 
include both assets that debtor has ownership to and assets falling within the deviating 
situations detailed below. 
One deviation concerns conflicting rights where the transferor retains a right to the asset in 
order to secure his right to the payment. The parties might have agreed that after delivery, the 
seller has the right to take the sold goods back and resell them if the buyer does not pay due 
amounts. Such ‘retention of title clauses’ could be viewed either as agreements on when 
ownership transfers or as establishing a security interest.3 Irrespective of approach, the asset 
could be outside the estate’s scope. The choice of perspective determines whether that is due 
to the debtor not owning the asset, or despite him doing so. Title retention clauses are the 
subject of chapter 4.   
Moreover, a bank could enjoy preferential right to repayment from certain assets upon 
defaulted payment, ensuring full repayment of their secured loan through such assets before 
                                                
2 See i.e. Hauge 2016, p. 93 on the principle applied to the Norwegian Creditors Recovery Act § 2-2. 






any other creditor may seek dividends in their proceeds. Examination of these rules become 
essential to ascertaining the scope of the estate, as such ‘security interests’ limit the estate’s 
access to the value of certain assets of the debtor’s. Chapter 5 details security interests and 
their common implication: the debtor’s ownership may be insufficient for the estate to access 
an asset. This is the first deviation from the causal relationship between the debtor’s 
ownership and the estate’s access to the asset.  
Another deviation is that ownership might not be necessary. Many jurisdictions have 
provisions that allow the administrator of the estate to void or revoke fraudulent transactions, 
recovering assets to distribute their proceeds among the creditors. Such ‘avoidance rules’, 
‘revocation rules’ or ‘clawback rules’ enable the estate to access assets that someone else 
already has acquired, at least insofar as the rules acknowledge the transfer as valid though 
reversible, and not as invalid in the first place. Because these rules are relevant to the 
underlying problem of what assets the creditor may seize, analysis of Chinese and Norwegian 
avoidance rules would be desirable. Ideally, one should also regard the possibility that a 
jurisdiction makes up for lenient rules on transfer of ownership by giving the estate 
administrator wide discretion to reverse transactions after bankruptcy is declared. However, 
avoidance rules are too vast a subject to compare within the scope of this thesis, and these 
rules remain an interesting subject for future study. 
Lastly, I will mention that certain belongings that do fall within the sphere of debtor’s 
property and would otherwise serve to satisfy creditor claims are still exempt from 
attachment to the estate even in absence of any security interest. The Norwegian Creditors 
Recovery Act chapter 2 gives detailed exceptions for personal belongings, stipends, public 
contributions, wage claims, money necessary to support the debtor and his household and 
more. These exceptions generally concern the debtor’s ‘bare necessities’, and personal 
bankruptcies. China lacks a law on personal bankruptcy, and a comparison would be of 
limited use. Furthermore, these exceptions are of limited relevance to movables in 
commercial transactions. As this thesis investigates how one under Chinese and Norwegian 
rules may diminish insolvency related risks in commerce, said exceptions will not be 
discussed. While Hong Kong and Macau are parts of the People’s Republic of China, the two 
administrative regions’ historic colonial ties to the United Kingdom and Portugal are 
reflected in them being separate jurisdictions from what is usually referred to as ‘Mainland 






This thesis compares the law of Norway and Mainland China, and any reference to China will 
refer to the mainland jurisdiction. 
1.2 Terminology 
1.2.1 Bankruptcy and insolvency 
Different jurisdictions may apply the term ‘bankruptcy’ differently. This comparison 
concerns the state of debtor’s property during liquidation. Liquidation is the process of 
seizing the insolvent debtor’s assets, converting them into money by sale, lease or similar 
transactions, and distributing that money among creditors in dividends. China has also 
adopted a corporate rescue scheme named ‘bankruptcy reorganisation’ (“破产重整”), which 
will be mentioned occasionally,4 although not described in general.  
To verify that Norwegian and Chinese bankruptcy liquidation rules apply to the same 
situation, one must clarify whether they apply the same criteria for accepting bankruptcy 
cases. To enter bankruptcy liquidation, Norwegian law stipulates two criteria; illiquidity (the 
debtor is unable to pay due debts) and insufficiency (the total assets amount to less than the 
total debts), cf. the Norwegian Bankruptcy Act §§ 60 and 61.  
The Chinese Enterprise Bankruptcy Law article 2 stipulates that if an enterprise “cannot pay 
due debts” (“不能偿到到期债务”) and “its assets are insufficient to pay off total debts” (“并
且资产不足以清偿全都债务”) or the enterprise “is obviously lacking payment capabilities” 
(“明显缺乏清偿能力的”), then “its liabilities shall be liquidated (…)”.  
It seems that both jurisdictions generally operate by the same two criteria for initiating 
liquidation; inability to clear of due debts, and total assets not exceeding total debts. That 
does not imply the requirements are necessarily similar in all respects. The Norwegian 
reservation for temporary illiquidity is one modification to the two criteria, another being the 
Chinese wording “obviously lacking payment capabilities” as an alternative to the 
insufficiency criterion.5 Yet, the overall criteria are largely convergent. 
                                                
4 See chapter 5.3.4. 






1.2.2 Property rights, ownership and security interests 
What constitutes a ‘property right’, ‘ownership’ or ‘security interest’ is a many-faceted 
debate relative to legal tradition. This thesis cannot apply the terms in all their complexity 
while maintaining the universality required for effective comparison. Still, it is necessary to 
define the meaning this thesis attributes to the terms, as they appear frequently. 
In the following chapters, I will by ‘property right’ refer to the legal subject’s right to one or 
several specific assets, unlike ‘obligatory right’, which refers to the same party’s right to 
fulfilment of a contractual obligation that may include transfer of agreed assets. Thus, 
property rights are widely regarded as subject to a ‘specificity principle’ 
(“spesialitetsprinsippet” in Norwegian, “客体特定原则” in Chinese), meaning that 
acquisition of property must relate to assets specified in the grounds for acquisition. Property 
rights only establish over specified assets.6  
In principle, property rights are enforceable against any subject, while obligatory rights may 
only be asserted against the party undertaking the obligation. Countries adhering to a 
numerus clausus principle prescribe a finite number of rights as property rights that can be 
effective against third parties, whereas other rights are obligatory and effective only between 
contracting parties.7  
The perhaps most far-reaching property right is ‘ownership’. Whereas the Roman law notion 
of dominium emphasises the absolute nature of the owner’s right to possess, use and dispose 
of the owned asset and to keep others from doing so, common-law jurisdictions tend to see 
ownership as a ‘bundle of sticks’; a collection various rights, nothing more.8 In this thesis, 
‘ownership’ will not refer to either of notion exclusively. I aim at clarifying when the debtor 
owns something, and to what extent the estate might deviate from the ownership sphere. The 
nature of ownership is less relevant for the analysis’ functional motivation. 
While creditors can be said to ‘own’ rights to performance, I will prefer the term ‘hold’ to 
avoid confusion. Yet, the meaning of the words should be deduced from the context. 
                                                
6 See i.e. Lilleholt 2012, pp. 258–260, Werthwein in Bu (ed.), p. 193 for concise descriptions of the principle in 
Norwegian and Chinese law, respectively. 
7 Marthinussen 2016, pp. 37–38. 






Among the other rights considered proprietary, ‘security interests’ or ‘charges’9 (here used 
synonymously) demand particular attention. 
Here, ‘security interests’, ‘collateral rights’ or ‘charges’ will all refer to any right to the 
partial or full value of one or several assets to satisfy monetary claims secured by said assets 
under a legal relationship between the creditor and the owner. A ‘fixed charge’ will refer to a 
security interest over specified property, whereas a ‘floating charge’ covers a fluctuating 
amount of property.10 
Categories of security interests hold different connotations.11 Here, ‘pledges’ will refer to 
possessory security interests,12 under which the holder must possess the asset securing the 
claim. ‘Mortgages’ will simply refer to non-possessory security interests.13 ‘Liens’ can be 
understood simply as a creditor’s right to retain a movable until the owner pays outstanding 
debt.14 Yet, it can be combined with a right to sell the property to satisfy the claim, as chapter 
5 will demonstrate. Here, I will explain the nature of a ‘lien’ under each jurisdiction. Used 
elsewhere, the term should be regarded as neither including nor precluding a right to sell. 
I primarily discuss transfer of property rights arising from commercial sales contracts. Hence, 
‘seller’ is used synonymously to ‘transferor’, ‘buyer’ to ‘transferee’ and ‘acquirer’.  
As this thesis mainly concerns tangible movables, it does not discuss intellectual property. 
1.2.3 Perfection and legal protection 
The term ‘perfection’ is commonly associated with, in the words of Bridge, “the steps that a 
secured creditor has to take in order to be able to oppose that security against other secured 
creditors, trustees in bankruptcy and company liquidators, and outright purchasers of the asset 
subject to security”.15 In Norway, this is commonly referred to as “rettsvern” (literally: 
“protection of rights”), although this term also encompasses legal protection of ownership. To 
                                                
9 On ‘charge’ as a general term, see McCormack, pp. 40–41. 
10 McCormack, pp. 47–48. 
11 For a historical overview: Zwalve in Kieninger (ed.), pp. 38–53. 
12 Ibid., pp. 47–49. 
13 This use of the term ‘mortgage’ could encompass either the civil-law ‘hypothec’, under which the creditor has 
no ownership to the asset, or the common-law ‘mortgage’, under which the creditor obtains legal title for 
security, cf. Ibid., pp. 49–50. On the nature of mortgages in Norway and China, see sub-chapter 5.3.1.  
14 Bridge, p. 170. 






avoid confusion between the two situations, I will translate rettsvern as ‘legal protection’ 
when referring to ownership and as ‘perfection’ when discussing security interests. ‘Third-
party protection’, on the other hand, accurately describes the legal effect under both 
circumstances, and is used in both contexts.  
1.3 Methodology 
As Zweigert & Kötz point out, “the legal system of every society faces essentially the same 
problems, and solves these problems through quite different means though very often with 
similar results”. In order to give such different means due consideration, they hold that the 
question of comparison “must be stated in purely functional terms”. Namely, “the problem 
must be stated without reference to the concepts of one’s own legal system”, and failure to do 
so might lead to the false conclusion that “that a foreign system has ‘nothing to report’ on a 
particular problem”.16 
Had the comparison concerned rights to urban land, the choice of a conceptual starting point 
would soon pose a problem. The Norwegian case Rt-1935-981 (Bygland) has been taken to 
prescribe that de facto ownership, is the relevant factor when determining whether or not 
property shall be included in the estate pursuant to the Norwegian Creditors Recovery Act § 
2-2. This would make it tempting to compare under what conditions an enterprise is the de 
facto ‘owner’ of the land under Norwegian and Chinese law. However, comparison of private 
‘ownership’ to land would be misguided, as the Chinese Property Law article 47 provides 
that “the urban lands are owned by the state”. Instead, one should begin with the underlying 
problem; to what extent the bankruptcy estate may utilise the land’s inherent value. Even 
though a Chinese private enterprise cannot own the urban land itself, they can own a 
transferrable right to use the land. The estate could monetise this valuable, much like a 
Norwegian estate would make use of the debtor’s ownership.  
Yet, analysing ‘debtor’s assets’ does indeed imply analysis of that concept’s contents and 
scope. My rationale for this conceptual starting point is that the previous sub-chapter’s 
functional analysis of how Norwegian and Chinese law approaches the limits of the estate 
                                                






unveils a mutually applicable concept necessitating clarification. Nonetheless, the method is 
not purely functionalist in this regard. 
Furthermore, functionalist method in its strictest sense depends on clarification beyond 
creditors’ formal rights to an asset. It necessitates investigation of both enforcement rules and 
how far law in books reflects current practice. China is a nation of approximately 1.4 billion 
people, with a four-tier court hierarchy from the national to the local level. This makes an 
extensive investigation of such practice a tremendous task beyond what is feasible within the 
project’s timeframe. Therefore, I will apply a hybrid approach, investigating the law as it can 
be understood from selected sources of law that are more or less comparable to Norwegian 
sources of law. This includes statutory law, its applicable equivalents and supplements such 
as Chinese judicial interpretations and Norwegian preparatory works, court practice from the 
upper end of the court hierarchy and assessments made in legal theory. In addition, I will 
consider possible legal solutions in light of the laws’ legislative purposes, especially where 
legal sources are scarce or unclear.  
I will mention corresponding or contrasting rules in other jurisdictions, such as England and 
Germany, insofar as they may explain or contrast the Chinese or Norwegian rules. This is 
simply for the sake of contextualisation, not authoritative reasoning for a given solution under 
Chinese or Norwegian law.  
In short: This thesis will analyse legal concepts where they are mutually applicable, yet with 
a functional perspective. The methodology is functionalist in its pursuit of the effective 
factors for ascertaining assets within the estate’s reach, yet conceptualist to the extent that a 
concept’s mutual applicability makes its clarification relevant to understanding ‘debtor’s 
assets’. The Norwegian and Chinese approaches with regards to transfer and retention of 
ownership differ to the degree that I discuss them in separate sub-chapters. Chinese and 
Norwegian security interests largely warrant the same questions, and chapter 5 will therefore 
compare Chinese and Norwegian law concurrently. 
1.4 Sources of law in China 






While sources of Chinese law are more available in the digital age than ever before, there is 
no official, universal channel for their publication. Westlaw and LexisNexis provide 
extensive databases. I have accessed the latter as a main source of English translations. I have 
upon comparison with the Chinese texts detected more than a few inaccuracies and mistakes, 
and found no single collection of sources that could both provide all the relevant source 
material and present them entirely free of inaccuracies. Therefore, I have resorted to 
translations from various sources, including researchers, various institutions in the business 
sector and Chinese government bodies to provide English translations of the law. 
Occasionally, I have translated statutes, terms and, especially, legal theory myself, due to no 
translation being available or accessible translations being inaccurate. Therefore, the English 
translations referenced do not necessarily correspond to the citations in this thesis.  
I have full responsibility for the translations and interpretations of Chinese sources. Yet, I 
cannot take credit for these, as they lean heavily on works of others, found in footnotes and 
indexes. Some translations in the thesis are identical to the sources consulted. Others are 
modified from American English to British English for consistency, while some underwent 
substantial modification or were translated directly from Chinese. I believe the result to 
reflect the meaning and wording of the original Chinese texts. References to other 
translations are for giving credit where credit is due. 
Where I omit the Chinese wording from the main text, I intend the English citation merely as 
means for explaining an argument, and not for detailed linguistic interpretation. Where any 
legal act has a widely accepted yet inaccurate name in English, I have used the common 
name, suggesting alternative translations in footnotes.17 
1.4.2 Statutory law 
The different sources of law in China and Norway warrant a few remarks. China identifies 
itself as a Civil Law legal system, and stresses how legal authority runs from the statutes 
rather than judgments. The statutory hierarchy runs from the Constitution (“宪法”), via laws 
(“法律”), regulations (“规章”), provisions (“条例”), rules (“规则”), detailed rules (“细则”), 
                                                
17 For example, the Chinese Guarantee Law should be translated ‘the Chinese Security Interest Law’, as it 






measures (“办法”), decisions (“决定”), resolutions (“决议”) and orders (“命令”),18 some of 
which are national, some local. I will exclusively consider national statutes, mostly in the 
form of laws (acts). 
1.4.3 Legislative instruments of the Supreme People’s Court 
Chinese law does not consider judgments to establish legal precedent, at least not as formally 
binding on the courts. However, the Supreme People’s Court has for decades published 
certain judgments through its Gazette and distributed others through more internal channels 
in the court hierarchy. There has been some legal debate on whether there in reality existed 
precedent, if not prescribed by law, than at least in practice by judges ruling in accordance 
with the higher courts’ opinion in previous cases on the same matter.19  
Furthermore, has China in recent years established a system of so-called ‘guiding cases’. 
These cases are rulings from anywhere in the court hierarchy that have been labelled by the 
Supreme People’s Court as a model to be referred to in future cases of a similar nature, due to 
their solution of an intricate or significant matter. Proposal Number 13 of the second Five-
Years Reform Outline for the People’s Court (2004-2008) states that guiding cases “should 
play the role in unifying the application of legislation by directing the lower courts’ 
operation, enriching and developing their jurisprudence and so on”.20 Jiang argues that even 
though the guiding cases are not binding per se, and therefore cannot form a judgment’s legal 
grounds, “it can be cited as a reason for explaining the judgement”.21 He further holds that the 
Supreme People’s Court’s Detailed Rules Concerning Work on Case Guidance support the 
view that “guiding cases were binding de facto, if not de jure”. To the extent that any of 
guiding cases apply to topics discussed, they are at least examples of the Supreme People’s 
Court confirming that the judgment is representative for current doctrine.  
This is relevant also because the Supreme People’s Court’s opinion of the law, even in 
absence of a precedent doctrine, carries legal authority over lower courts. The Supreme 
People’s Court regularly issues views on points of law in four main forms. The ‘Decisions’, 
‘Provisions’ and ‘Interpretations’ are abstract, general statements of law either clarifying of 
                                                
18 For detailed accounts, see Jiang, p. 330. 
19 Liu, p. 108. 
20 Jiang, p. 332. 






unclear points of an existing statutory law, or supplementing or modifying law by regulating 
situations where existing statutes fall short.22 They formally carry less legal authority than 
statutory law, yet are “analogous to legal code”, according to Fu, who argues that they aims 
at “providing specific, comprehensive and detailed rules supplementing substantive or 
procedural laws enacted by the legislature to offer judges a unified legal basis for trial”.23 
 
The replies are interpretations given at the request from courts in the previous instance, often 
in connection with a current trial where the court needs instructions or approval on a matter. 
They relate to specific cases, bind all courts and may provide legal grounds in future cases, 
yet differ from precedent in not being based on the facts of the cases they provide guidance 
for.24  
Hence, one should not take the lack of a doctrine on precedent as indication that the judiciary 
has a minor legislative role under Chinese law, and one must consider relevant compiled 
cases, guiding cases and judicial interpretations in the analysis. However, only the latter have 
binding force,25 and deserve considerable attention. 
1.4.4 Judgments of the lower courts 
Judgments further down the judicial hierarchy naturally carry less normative value. In 
absence of Supreme People’s Court decisions on a matter of legal interpretation, I will take 
High Court judgments as illustrations of a problem, or indications of an interpretation being 
plausible. They should however be seen only as that, and not as carrying precedent. 
1.5 Sources of law in Norway: A brief overview 
While statutory acts are the primary source of law in Norway, their format is often brief and 
general. Thus, precise interpretation relies heavily on preparatory works from the drafting of 
the statute and on case law, which carry significant authoritative precedent, although not 
absolute, binding force on future judgment. Norwegian jurisprudence also recognises public 
                                                
22 Fu, pp. 27–28. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Jiang, p. 332 states that although the Chinese constitution vests legislative sovereignty in the National 







practice, legal theory and policy considerations (“reelle hensyn”) as valid sources of law, but 
with significantly weaker authoritative value, so that they seldom prevail over a clearly 
formulated case law or precedent. Only a selected few Norwegian statutes and judgments are 
available in English. The translations in this thesis draw upon other translations referenced, 
but I have made adaptations where I deemed it necessary. Beyond singular terms, I have not 






2 Codification efforts in history 
Whereas the Norwegian Constitution article § 94 prescribed until 2014 that the parliament 
was to promulgate a Civil Code, the provision never resulted in a unified code, and efforts (in 
particular after World War II) rather produced a collection of individual acts on the relevant 
matters. Since the end of the Qing dynasty, China has also made repeated attempts at a 
unified Civil Code.26 Formally beginning in 1908, students with experience from foreign 
jurisdictions, not to mention Japanese scholar Matsuoka Yoshimasa (松岡義正), who 
oversaw the book on property rights in the Draft Civil Code of the Qing Empire, which was 
the forerunner to current law in Taiwan, yet never entered into force due to the end of 
Imperial China. Codification efforts continued throughout the Republic of China period, and 
like the Qing Draft, subsequent drafts were heavily influenced by the German pandectist 
school and Japanese Civil Law, which is in turn based on German law.27  
This provided German continental legal thought with an early foothold in China. Liang holds 
that this resulted “in a deep and far-reaching influence on modern Chinese civil law 
legislation and civil law theory”.28 Liang argues that Japan’s (and in turn, China’s) affinity 
for German law over common law was due to the technological advantages of the former, as 
legal development in continental law is less dependent on precedent and leaves more 
authority to legislative propositions.29 After establishment of the People’s Republic of China, 
codification efforts incorporated Soviet Law, which also was influenced by German law.30  
Yet, after the ‘reform and opening up’-policy of Deng Xiaoping, which from 1977 onwards 
introduced the ‘socialist market economy’ to China, legislators found profound social 
changes to make implementation of a complete civil code difficult and, like Norway, resorted 
to promulgation of individual laws.31 Some were more widely discussed than others, such as 
the Chinese Property Law of 2007, debated for over a decade due to the proposal’s equal 
recognition of private, state and collective ownership. The General Principles of Civil Law of 
1986 are overarching, as are the General Provisions of Civil law promulgated in 2017. The 
                                                
26 For a concise overview on which this account is based, see Liang (ed.), pp. xi–xxiii. 
27 Ibid., p. xiii 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., p. xv. 
30 Ibid., p. xvi. 






latter constitutes the first book of a new Civil Code. While the General Provisions are already 
effective, the remaining Code is to be presented later in 2018 and promulgated in 2020.32  
In the chapters below, I will identify and explain the scattered, statutory rules that govern 
which movable assets the estate may seize. 
                                                







3 Transfer of property rights:  
When does the right transfer?  
3.1 Delivery versus agreement 
3.1.1 Two main approaches 
When a party to a sale goes bankrupt before contractual fulfilment, the question arises: Who 
has the right to the sold goods? This question appears in two main variants: Whether the 
paying buyer may separate the goods from the insolvent seller’s estate, and whether the 
unpaid seller may reclaim goods designated for an insolvent buyer. The answer depends on 
when applicable rules allow the property right to transfer. 
A useful context for the Norwegian and Chinese legislative approaches to transfer of property 
rights is that of the two main approaches for ascertaining the time when ownership rights to 
movables transfer; the ‘traditio principle’ (or ‘delivery principle’) and the ‘consensus 
principle’.  
The traditio principle generally sets the transfer of property rights to the time of physical 
delivery. It is a rule with exceptions, and the three common surrogates to physical delivery 
are traditio brevi manu, traditio longa manu and constitutum possessorium. 
Traditio brevi manu, or shorthand delivery, implies that a debtor already in possession of the 
item purchased obtains the property rights once he and the counterparty conclude the sales 
contract, so that the buyer does not return the item to the seller only to have it delivered back 
to himself. 
Traditio longa manu applies to the situations where a third party possesses the item on behalf 
of the seller. If one brother buys a bicycle from the other, and the bicycle is stored in their 
parents’ garage, the seller does not need to collect the bicycle and deliver it to his brother. 
Notifying the parents that the purchasing brother is the new owner of the bike is enough, and 






Constitutum possessorium is an exception by which the parties agree to have the legal 
possession transferred to the buyer, although the seller retains physical possession.  
Germany is a jurisdiction that uses the delivery principle with variants of the aforementioned 
exceptions, cf. §§ 929 and 930 BGB, requiring agreement (“Einigung”) and delivery 
(“Übergabe”).33 
England takes the other approach, and its consensus principle (or ‘agreement principle’) 
leaves more to party autonomy. The Sale of Goods Act 1979 section 17 (1) stipulates that 
“[w]here there is a contract for the sale of specific or ascertained goods the property in them 
is transferred at such time as the parties to the contract intend it to be transferred”. That 
intention is, according to section 17 (2), ascertained with regard to “the terms of the contract, 
the conduct of the parties and the circumstances of the case”. From the wording of the statute, 
the transfer of property is not entirely up to the parties, due to the minimum requirement that 
the goods are “specific” or “ascertained” (should they be generic), cf. sections 16 and 17.34  
3.1.2 Unitary versus functional approaches to property transfer 
In short, the unitary approach to property transfer refers to the view that at one point in time, 
the property right (or rather, the different facets of the property right) pass as a whole from 
one party to the other. Contrastingly, the functionalist or relativist approach implies that the 
acquirer may exercise owner’s rights in one respect but not another.35 
Most European countries36 apply a unitary approach to property transfer,37 asking whether the 
property right is with the insolvent debtor or his predecessor or successor. Ascertaining the 
owner of the asset also determines whether the debtor’s estate may take the asset. Under this 
perspective, determining the scope of the bankruptcy estate is mostly a matter of determining 
who has ownership over the assets. When the main rule is that the bankruptcy estate is 
limited to the debtor’s assets, ascertaining the estate’s assets becomes synonymous with 
clarifying the main rule’s extent. 
                                                
33 For detailed yet concise accounts, see i.e. Göranson, pp. 105–124 and Hauge 2016, pp. 77–79. 
34 Hauge 2016, p. 78. 
35 For a comparative overview: Lilja, pp. 13–16. 
36 Hauge 2016, p. 58. 






Under the Nordic functionalist approach, contrastingly, the perspective could be the opposite. 
In certain situations, ascertaining the estate’s assets might as well imply clarifying the main 
rule’s exceptions. The Nordic functionalist approach leaves the time of property transfer 
unanswered, asking instead whether the alleged right has been ensured protection against a 
third party’s conflicting interest in the asset. It could be that the property right under 
Norwegian law is no longer with the insolvent debtor inter partes, but with an acquirer. 
However, if the acquirer of the goods fails to perform the necessary acts to ensure legal 
protection against a third party’s creditors, he may still see the estate confiscate and liquidate 
his acquired goods. In that respect, one could see the Norwegian rules of legal protection of 
property rights against third party as an exception to, or limitation of, the main rule of 
limiting the bankruptcy estate to the bankrupt’s own assets. 
3.1.3 Relevant policy considerations of property law 
Although various jurisdictions’ compulsory requirements for recognition of property 
acquisition aim to balance creditor protection with commercial efficiency, the relative nature 
of the Nordic functionalist approach arguably provides significant argumentative leeway for 
when a property right enjoys protection against a third party. This leeway warrants some 
description of arguments that typically hold particular relevance in property law. These can 
be referred to as ‘policy considerations’ (“reelle hensyn”).38  
Below, I will give a brief account of such important considerations, albeit with a certain bias 
to their interpretation in Norwegian and, to some degree, Chinese law. The reason for the 
particular attention to the Norwegian concepts relates to Norwegian property law’s 
relativism: As Hauge notes,39 the fact that Norway may find the right to be perfected in one 
respect but not another, not only gives the concepts value as presumed intentions of the 
legislature. They also become factors for ascertaining the applicable rule where the law is 
uncertain.  
Lilleholt advises caution in taking these interests as prescribing specific legal effects, and 
argues that the terms are merely useful to aid the understanding of the law and, “if possible”, 
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identifying an underlying system.40 While he argues that neither the terms nor the system 
explained can be used directly to deduce legal effect, Lilleholt still recognises that “one may, 
and should, emphasise system and consequence when assessing doubtful legal problems”, 
due to the need for predictability, as is Hauge’s point. Yet, the predictability argument goes 
both ways, and establishing rules on a case-by-case basis will make it hard for business actors 
to know the law.41  
Public notice 
In Norwegian legal theory, Lilleholt stresses the importance of three particular interests, 42 
some more known outside of Norway than others. Acts that enable the public, including 
concerned creditors, to inspect the debtor’s disposal of property to which others hold legal 
interests achieve the effect of public notice (“publisitet”43 in Norwegian, “公示”44 in 
Chinese). The extent to which an action ensures public notice is an important factor in 
assessing what acts are necessary for legal protection. Entry into a register open to inspection 
is a very effective means of ensuring public notice, and is commonly a condition for transfer 
of certain valuable goods, typically immovable property, motor vehicles, ships and aircrafts. 
The value of such goods typically requires third parties to provide credit, and exposes these 
creditors to considerable economic risk and interest in the debtor’s dealings.  
“Notoritet” in Norwegian law 
In Norwegian law, another important consideration is the need for “notoritet”, a term that 
does not lend itself to simple translation. In his Norwegian-English legal dictionary, Ronald 
L. Craig explains the Norwegian concept of notoritet as “a character or form which gives the 
ability to establish subsequently, whether the transaction has in fact taken place, the date of 
                                                
40 Lilleholt 1996, p. 69. 
41 Apart from Lilleholt, Marthinussen 2016 reiterates this point. In the book, largely devoted to methodological 
application of these interests, Marthinussen is generally more inclined to accept a consequence-oriented 
approach as grounds for general rules, cf. Marthinussen 2016, pp. 70 and 151, and finds that deviations from the 
apparent meaning of the statutory text is primarily permissible where legislators have “exaggerated or 
overlooked important aspects”, cf. p. 238. Truyen, pp. 348–350 argues the same point: The interests are relevant 
to interpretation, yet one must “strive to interpret the provisions so that conflicts due to an unclear rule are 
avoided”. 
42 Lilleholt 1996, p. 70. 
43 Ibid., where the term is taken to mean that “something is more or less freely available to the inspection of 
others”. 
44 See i.e. Liang & Chen, pp. 78–88, summarising the concept’s core on p. 78: “The motivation of public notice 






transaction and the true terms of the transaction”. Lilleholt defines it as follows: “If we say 
that something (…) has notoritet, we tend to mean that it can be tested, controlled”. 
Thus, ‘notoriety’ does not hold the same connotations in legal English vernacular. The 
Norwegian term refers to the ability to verify the true legitimacy, nature and contents of the 
legal relationship, not its general recognition. Notoritet is not simply a matter of a 
transaction’s legitimacy being provable through evidence. It is a question of whether the 
manner of transaction in itself produces the satisfactory verifiability.  
Apparent authority and good faith 
However, transactional security is not achieved simply by securing the seller’s creditors. By 
the time a transaction is found not to meet applicable criteria motivated by public notice and 
notoritet, an acquirer might already have taken possession of the goods and might either have 
an interest in the asset or actual ownership. The law must enable a purchaser to pay and 
assume that he obtains what he has purchased. Most people would presume that a seller 
holding registered ownership of an apartment or possession of a bicycle either owns the asset 
or acts in accordance with an authority that the owner has conveyed upon him. This apparent 
authority (“legitimasjon” in Norwegian, “表见代理权”45 in Chinese) is an important factor in 
assessing whether the purchaser was in good faith. Where the seller lacked authority to 
dispose of the sold asset, such good faith might be grounds for the purchaser extinguishing 
the real owner’s rights, acquiring them by means of bona fide acquisition. Such acquisitions 
are not a main subject of this thesis, but as apparent authority is one factor to balance in 
choice of legislative approach, and bona fide acquirers appear occasionally in interpretation 
of bankruptcy related statutes, both terms warrant a mention here. Yet, while apparent 
authority is an important concern in bona fide acquisition, Norwegian law considers apparent 
authority an irrelevant circumstance with respect to a creditor’s extinctive acquisition, such as 
bankruptcy liquidation. Where a debtor’s valuables are a precondition for lending, the lender 
should take security in them.46  
Commercial efficiency and party autonomy 
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Whereas registration and, albeit to a lesser extent, physical possession enables the public to 
inspect and verify the legitimacy of the sale, it puts restrictions on contractual freedom and 
restricts to what extent to contracting parties may agree upon a transaction they deem suitable 
for their needs. The purchaser might not have storage room to take delivery of new stock. The 
seller might be abroad and unable to register the transfer upon conclusion of the contract. 
And philosophically, different ideas on individual autonomy affect the freedom of an owner 
to dispose of the property as deemed fit.47 While traditio permits some exceptions to the 
delivery rule in many jurisdictions,48 one might say that consensus favours the contracting 
parties’ intentions and needs by allowing them to tailor the transfer of ownership. 
3.2 China 
3.2.1 When does ownership transfer? 
Numerous Chinese statutes provide that the main condition for transfer of ownership to 
movable property under Chinese law is ‘delivery’, suggesting that the estate of an insolvent 
seller may seize sold goods not yet delivered.  
Under the Chinese Contract Law article 133, “ownership of a subject matter transfers upon 
delivery thereof, unless otherwise prescribed by law or agreed by the parties concerned”. 
Similarly, the Chinese Property Law states in its basic principles, article 6, that 
“establishment or transfer of property rights to movables shall be subject to delivery in 
accordance with the law”, unlike property rights to immovables, which are subject to 
registration pursuant to the same article. 
From these two statutes alone, it is evident that the main requirement for legal protection of 
the transaction is delivery. In other words, China has opted for the traditio principle as its 
main approach to transfer of property rights to movables.  
                                                
47 Brækhus & Hærem hold the philosophy of natural law as a historical backdrop for the consensus approach, cf. 
Brækhus & Hærem, p. 500. 
48 Sweden is an exception, and displays a particularly rigid delivery requirement, cf. the Swedish Sale of 






Subchapter 3.2.2 details which acts constitute delivery, including both actual delivery and 
other, more symbolic acts that are given the same legal effect as physical delivery (‘delivery 
surrogates’). After clarifying the meaning of ‘delivery’, subchapter 3.2.3 discusses whether 
the Chinese delivery principle is mandatory, or merely a default rule that may be abandoned 
by agreement. 
3.2.2 What constitutes “delivery”? 
Establishing whether a delivery requirement exists is insufficient to ascertain whether some 
asset was delivered, as the opinions might differ on whether delivery has happened. While 
Sweden is exceptionally strict concerning which actions constitute delivery, 49 other 
jurisdictions might be more lenient, accepting somewhat symbolic delivery. As explained 
under 3.2.1, the most common ways to deliver the asset are by physical (or actual) delivery, 
or one of its three surrogates: traditio brevi manu, traditio longa manu or constitutum 
possessorium. Likewise, China operates with several different forms of delivery: ‘actual 
delivery’ (“实际交付”), ‘simplistic delivery’ (“简易交付”), ‘indicative delivery’ (“指示交
付”) and ‘constitutum possessorium’ (“占有改定”).50 The paragraphs below will examine 
whether the Chinese forms of delivery actually correspond to the actual delivery, traditio 
longa manu, traditio brevi manu and constitutum possessorium recognised in German law. 
Actual delivery (实际交付)51 
The term “actual delivery” is not used in the statutes themselves, and the Chinese Property 
Law only refers to “delivery”, or “交付” (“jiaofu”). The Chinese word is comprised of two 
characters with their own distinctive meanings that when combined express the full meaning 
of the word. The first one, “交” (“jiao”), depicts two legs crossed, and literally means “to 
cross”.52 In a wider sense, this crossing is used in various words where certain objects change 
hands. This could be a one-way transaction, such as in “交给” (“jiaogei”, “to give”). It could 
also be a reciprocated transaction, such as in “交换” (“jiaohuan”, “to exchange”), or 
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50 I.e. Werthwein in Bu (ed.), pp. 202–203. 
51 Ibid., p. 202. 






unspecified, as is the case with “转交” (“zhuanjiao”, “to transfer”). In other words, the 
character implies some transfer or another, physical or abstract. 
The second character, “付” (“fu”), literally means “to give”. The left part of the character 
symbolises a man standing upright, whereas the right half represents a hand, symbolising the 
action of giving something to others.53 Often used interchangeably with jiao in words like 
“付给” (“fugei”, “to give” or “to pay”), it gives few additional clues as to what delivery 
means. The word jiaofu certainly refers to handing over something, yet does not clarify 
whether this something must be physical in nature, or if handing over indirect possession 
suffices. 
However, contextual interpretation suggests the former, as all three delivery surrogates 
transfer legal rights independently of the physical object, as accounted for subchapters below. 
One could thus presume the main rule to demand transfer of physical possession. 
One finds another indication of physical delivery in the GPCL Opinions. In their article 84, 
the Supreme People’s Court states:   
“Where property has been delivered, but the parties concerned agree that its 
ownership transfers subject to conditions, property ownership transfers upon fulfilment of the 
additional conditions”. 
While the purpose of the provision is rather to clarify the effect of agreements withholding 
property rights post-delivery, not to define delivery itself, it distinguishes between ‘delivery’ 
and transfer of rights. This indicates that delivery refers to change in physical possession. 
Another indication is the High Court case Qingdao Yuanhongxiang Textile Co., Ltd. v. 
Gangrun (Liaocheng) Printing and Dyeing Co., Ltd. One of the statements from the summary 
issued by the Supreme People’s Court Gazette provides some guidance as to what “delivery” 
means: “The so-called ‘delivery’ meant the transfer of possession or certificate of title 
possessed to another person”.  
Furthermore, the summary refers to the Contract Law article 133, stating that “ownership of a 
subject matter transfers upon delivery thereof, unless otherwise prescribed by law or agreed 
by the parties concerned”.  
                                                






Article 135 reiterates this:  
“The seller shall towards the buyer carry out his duties of delivering the subject 
matter or documentation for the buyer’s collection of the subject matter, and of transferring 
ownership to the subject matter”.  
In conclusion, the main rule is physical delivery by handing over the object itself or 
documents certifying ownership, i.e. bills of lading. 
Where the seller has already dispatched the asset to the buyer when the latter goes insolvent, 
neither have direct possession. In this situation, the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law article 39 
stipulates that if the “sold subject matter is not yet received nor fully paid by the debtor, the 
seller may take back subject matter in transit”. However, if the administrator would rather 
pay and receive the asset, he has the power to request delivery subject to article 39 second 
sentence. The Bankruptcy Provisions (II) article 39 stipulates that the courts may support the 
seller’s repossession of the goods before and after delivery, yet only if the seller requested the 
carrier or possessor to return the goods before delivery. Therefore, the stoppage in transit rule 
in the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law article 39 simply refers to the period prior to delivery. 
Simplistic delivery (“简易交付”) – is it traditio brevi manu? 
Under article 25 of the Chinese Property Law, where a debtor has legal possession prior to 
“establishment or transfer of a movable’s property rights”, the property rights “take effect 
upon the effectiveness of the legal act”54 (“自法律行为生效时发生效力”). As no return and 
redelivery is required, ‘simplistic delivery’ corresponds to traditio brevi manu.55 
Indicative delivery (“指示交付”) – is it traditio longa manu? 
The so-called ‘indicative delivery’ of article 26 prescribes that where “a third party legally 
possesses the movable” prior to the right’s establishment or transfer, “the person undertaking 
delivery obligations may instead delivery by transferring the right to request the third party to 
return the original object” (“负有交付义务的人可以通过转让请求第三人返还原物的权利
交付”). As demonstrated in the Supreme People’s Court’s judgment in Concordia 
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Agricultural Products (Shanghai) Ltd v. Guangdong Fuhong Oil Products Ltd and Zhanjiang 
Branch of China Construction Bank Co., Ltd, the provision is not entirely specific as to what 
transfers are sufficient. In the case, which concerned shipped soy beans from Argentina, it 
was deemed insufficient for the seller to transfer a delivery order (“提货单”), as it was not a 
certificate of title such as a bill of lading (“提单”). Where one does not transfer a title 
certificate, notification of the third party is necessary.56 This notification being necessary, the 
regime quite resembles traditio longa manu. 
Constitutum possessorium (“占有改定”)  
The Chinese Property Law article 27 stipulates that “where both parties agree on the seller 
continuing to possess the movable when transferring property rights to a movable, the 
property right takes effect upon said agreement”. This rule is in legal theory57 and the 
aforementioned case between Qingdao Yuanhongxiang and Gangrun (Liaocheng) described 
as a rule on “占有改定”, translating to constitutum possessorium. Linguistic similarities aside, 
the Court found the rule to recognise transfer of ownership where the seller had a 
contractually agreed physical possession, so that the acquirer had indirect possession. The 
agreement in question did not specify such a right, and the buyer’s claim was rejected. As the 
interpretation of article 27 embodies the essence of the traditional constitutum possessorium 
exception, China’s rules on notional delivery are mirror images of the traditional exceptions 
to the delivery rules.  
China has thus adopted a delivery scheme closely adhering to the German civil law 
framework, an unsurprising choice in light of the German pandectist tradition’s historic 
influence on China’s various civil code drafts. The fundamentals of property acquisition 
codified in the Chinese Property Law of 2007 continue this tradition. 
3.2.3 Is the delivery rule mandatory?  
Article 6 in the Chinese Property Law states that “establishment or transfer of property rights 
to movables shall be subject to delivery in accordance with the law”, and seemingly leaves no 
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under the Chinese Maritime Law article 71. 






room for parties to choose transfer of ownership upon contractual conclusion (a consensus 
model). However, the Chinese Contract Law article 133 is more ambiguous, somewhat 
contradicting the Chinese Property Law article 6. The wording “unless otherwise…agreed by 
the parties concerned” in the Contract Law seemingly leaves it to the parties’ discretion 
whether property rights transfer at the time of delivery or at another time.  
One could see Chinese Contract Law article 133 as letting the parties’ agreement prevail 
where any agreement exists, rendering the traditio principle a default rule only applicable in 
absence of agreement. Interestingly, this would converge with the solution chosen in the 
model law Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) VIII. –2:101 (1) (e), requiring that 
“there is an agreement as to the time ownership is to pass and the conditions of his agreement 
are met, or, in the absence of such agreement, delivery or an equivalent to delivery”. 
One could also resolve the contradiction by holding that the Property Law is both lex 
posterior and lex specialis, letting the Chinese Property Law article 6 prevail. Moreover, if 
the delivery requirement is merely optional, the reiterations of the need for delivery seem 
both unnecessary and misleading. Optional transfer by agreement would also make the 
Property Law article 27 on constitutum possessorium redundant: Constitutum possessorium 
gives the effect of delivery to a separate agreement on letting the transferor retain possession 
of the asset, providing the parties with much of the autonomy that the consensus principle 
maintains. If another layer of autonomy were intended outside constitutum possessorium, one 
might argue that the constitutum possessorium rule should be omitted altogether.  
Another possible interpretation could be that the parties’ agreement may not concern whether 
delivery is required, but rather whether physical delivery pursuant to article 23 is required, or 
delivery surrogates stipulated in articles 26 and 27 will suffice. One could put forth 
contextual arguments against this interpretation as well. Chinese Contract Law article 133 
recognises other solutions than actual delivery in two cases: where the law stipulates as 
much, and where the parties so agree. If one interprets article 133 so that the “agree 
otherwise” exception only refers to agreements concerning the statutory delivery surrogates, 
that raises the question of what the “unless prescribed by law” exception refers to. An answer 
might lie in article 25 on registrable movables, as well as the registration rules for 
immovables (the wording “subject matter” in article 133 is, after all, wide enough to cover 






vessels and aircrafts require registration for the property right to take effect.58 This is an 
example of the “law prescrib[ing] otherwise”, without regard to any agreement between the 
parties. Therefore, one might say that the parties can only agree on the delivery surrogates 
stipulated in law, while still complying with articles 6 and 23 by adhering to solutions 
prescribed by law. Meanwhile, the “otherwise prescribed by law” exception in article 133 
could be said to refer to immovable and registrable movables subject to registration under 
article 25 etc.  
While somewhat confusing, this interpretation seemingly reconciles the different wordings. 
Werthwein seems to presume this solution when he describes constitutum possessorium 
pursuant to article 27.  
He writes that “[t]he parties have to make an explicit agreement to this effect, e.g. a lease 
agreement between the transferee as lessor and the transferor as lessee; the agreement on the 
transfer of ownership itself, e.g. a sale and purchase contract, is not sufficient. Ownership 
passes on to the transferee upon conclusion of both agreements”.59 
This would be inconsistent with a consensus principle, which, after all, gives the transfer of 
rights effect upon conclusion of the sales contract itself. Furthermore, Werthwein refers to a 
case from the High People’s Court of Shandong that concerns the very essence of the 
question:  
In Qingdao Yuanhongxiang Textile Co., Ltd. v Gangrun (Liaocheng) Printing and Dyeing 
Co., Ltd, enterprise A and B had outstanding receivables from enterprise C. The parties 
agreed that A would sell all its receivables to B, and that enterprise C could offset its debts 
with seven pieces of mechanical equipment that C owned. The agreement stipulated that 
ownership would transfer immediately upon conclusion of the contract, and that C would 
deliver the machines afterwards. However, C did not deliver the equipment on the agreed 
date, and plaintiff A requested the court to order defendant C to deliver the equipment and 
pay legal costs.  
C, now bankrupt, held that the ownership was not transferred due to delivery not being made, 
and that the seven pieces of equipment were now insolvent assets under the bankruptcy 
estate. C also took company A’s declaration of claims in the bankruptcy estate as an 
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acknowledgement of being a regular creditor, and that neither constitutum possessorium, 
indicative delivery nor simplistic delivery applied to the situation. After appealing to the High 
Court, A lost the case for the second time. The Court stated that the equipment was movable 
property, and that the method of publicity for movable property is generally possession and 
delivery. Delivery implied “transferring the property or certificate of title possessed to 
another person”. The court took the delivery requirement pursuant to article 23 as mandatory, 
and that the exceptions in Chinese Contract Law article 133 “covered all forms of intangible 
delivery as permitted by law, other than actual delivery”. As for reconciling the conflicting 
provisions, the high Court held that the Property Law provision, being the most recent law on 
the matter, only served further to clarify the exception in the Contract Law. The Court found 
that “the parties could only, by agreement, choose one specific form of delivery from the four 
statutory forms of delivery, and there were no other forms for lawful property rights in 
movables”.  
As a model case in the Supreme People Court’s Gazette, the judgment does not have the 
normative value of a guiding case, yet still implies that the Supreme People’s Court 
considered it noteworthy for future adjudication. While not citable in a judgment, it indicates 
Chinese adherence to a mandatory delivery principle of the German model, where variants of 
traditio brevi manu, traditio longa manu and constitutum possessorium constitute the only 
acceptable exceptions to physical delivery. On the other hand, one may argue that delivery 
supplemented by constitutum possessorium in effect makes delivery unnecessary upon 
separate agreement, and in a factual sense renders traditio merely a default rule, if not in the 
formal sense.60 
3.2.4 What are the consequences of contractual invalidity? 
Seemingly, the Chinese publicity requirements converge with the German requirements to a 
large degree. Where the act of delivery (actual or notional) was performed, the third party 
must respect the transferee’s acquisition of ownership. Given how the acceptable forms of 
delivery in Germany correspond to the Chinese forms, it could be tempting to assume that 
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transfers of non-secured movables will largely have the same outcomes in Chinese 
bankruptcy proceedings as in German ones.  
However, the analysis above has not questioned the sales contract’s validity. Under German 
law, property rights are subject to a separation principle and an abstraction principle. The 
separation principle implies that the acquirer’s right to receive delivery of a certain good is 
different from a property right to the good itself, and that these rights arise from separate 
legal acts. The contractual right to demand delivery is obligatory, and is acquired by a buyer 
upon concluding the contract. Yet, he does not have a property right (or ‘right in rem’) to the 
good itself until a separate legal act (a so-called ‘real agreement’) is concluded, even if this 
second act is only implicitly agreed by the parties making and taking delivery.61  
That begs the question of how these rights are interrelated. Subject to German law, you can 
most certainly have a right to demand delivery without a claim to ownership of the object to 
be delivered. This is an important distinction in a bankruptcy: If you only have an obligatory 
right to delivery, you might sue the estate for damages or terminate the contract and demand 
return of the price paid. In both cases, you will be an unsecured creditor with a claim to 
dividends, which might leave you short of full restitution. If you have a property right to the 
object, however, you would have the right to separate the asset from the estate and thereby 
ensuring you contractual performance as per the agreement. 
A second question is what happens when you have taken delivery of the good, which would 
normally imply acquisition of ownership, only later to discover that the underlying contract 
was invalid. The seller might never have been owner in the first place, thus unable to transfer 
ownership (nemo dat quod non habet). Is the property right then dependent on the validity of 
the obligatory right? 
In Germany, the answer is no, and that is the essence of the ‘abstraction principle’. If party B 
performed the necessary action to ensure third-party protection (registering his acquisition of 
real estate or taking delivery of movables), B has the property right, whereas transferor A 
merely has a right to return of the asset. Since the property right is abstract from the 
underlying obligation, B’s bankruptcy estate is able to confiscate the goods.62  
                                                







The alternative is ‘causal transfer’, leaving the property right reliant on the validity of the 
obligatory right. If B went bankrupt after acquisition on an invalid contract, B’s estate would 
not get a hold of the sold good, as it was never B’s asset in the first place. 
According to Werthwein, China has a system of causal transfer. 63 It is debated whether there 
is even a separation principle, though this debate refers to the separation principle in the sense 
of there being a temporal discrepancy between contractual obligation and acquisition of the 
property right, which is somewhat different from the German use of the term. Werthwein sees 
the requirement of delivery as a requirement of a factual act, not a legal one, and concludes 
therefore that China has no separation principle.  
Regardless of the separation principle, the functional implication of causal transfer is the 
same; contractual invalidity prohibits a transfer of property rights in China. This is a central 
point at which Chinese and German property laws diverge. 
According to Chen,64 the choice of causal versus abstract transfer was debated for years, 
before Chinese legislators decided on the former model. Yet, it is only implicit in the statutes. 
Article 19 in the Chinese Property Law (on registration of immovables) states that “a right 
holder or interested party believing an item to be incorrectly registered in the immovable 
register, may apply for correction of registration”, as opposed to simply having a right to 
return of property under unjust enrichment rules, such as in Germany. Article 25 governing 
traditio brevi manu is another indication: the property right “shall become valid as of the time 
when such legal act becomes effective”. On the relation between contractual validity and 
effectiveness of the contractual obligation, the Chinese Contract Law article 44 states that a 
“legally established contract becomes effective upon establishment”, whereas article 56 states 
that “invalid or revoked contracts are without binding force from the outset”. Furthermore, 
article 58 states that “after invalidating or revoking a contract, property acquired under the 
contract shall be returned”. Moreover, the causal relationship between validity and effective 
property transfer is implied in Guiding Case no. 33, Cargill International SA v. Fujian Jinshi 
Vegetable Oil Producing Co., Ltd. and Others. Fujian Jinshi owed debts to Cargill 
International after a settlement, and Cargill had security for the debt in Jinshi’s assets, which 
Jinshi transferred at low prices to affiliated companies knowing of the debt. The court 
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deemed this collusion in bad faith, invalidating the contract. Although it could not order the 
property surrendered to Cargill, who never owned the property, the court ordered it returned 
to Jinshi, whereas Cargill retained security interests in it. 
In short, German and Chinese law diverge on consequences of contractual invalidity. 
Whereas German law accepts the ownership as passed onto the insolvent debtor, leaving the 
asset accessible to the estate, Chinese property transfer relies on a valid underlying contract 
with effective obligations. Where the debtor obtains an asset under an invalid contract, he 
will himself have to return it under the Contract Law article 58. In an insolvency, the property 
is not part of “debtor’s assets”, and article 38 of the Chinese Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 
stipulates that where “the debtor possesses assets not his own, the owner of such assets may 
take back the assets through the bankruptcy administrator unless otherwise prescribed by this 
Law”.  
3.3 Norway 
3.3.1 The Creditors Recovery Act § 2-2 
Under Norwegian Law, the Creditors Recovery Act § 2-2 is the starting point for determining 
which assets may be recovered by creditors, in or outside insolvency. The pressing question 
is whether an asset “belongs to the debtor” (“tilhører skyldneren”).  
The provision can be read as an expression of the nemo dat principle, stipulating that the 
insolvent debtor’s creditors cannot have any greater right than the debtor himself. If the 
debtor has no proprietary claim to the asset, nor will the creditors.65 The exceptions are again 
the rules on administrator’s choices of rescinding contracts and avoiding transactions. 
The Bygland Case: de facto ownership vs. apparent authority 
Furthermore, the wording “belongs” is taken to refer to the de facto ownership, as opposed to 
formal or/and apparent ownership. This can be gathered from the judgment Rt-1935-981 
(Bygland): A father had lost his farm in a forced sale, but repossessed it through his then 
underage son’s hereditary redemption right (odelsrett), making the latter the formal owner. 
                                                






Yet, the father was the de facto owner of the farm. Upon the son’s later bankruptcy, the 
creditors sued to recover their claims through the farm. However, the Supreme Court agreed 
on the district court’s assessment that the son’s creditors could not take the farm, as it was 
indeed owned by the debtor’s father. Even though the creditors provided their loans in good 
faith as the deed gave the son apparent authority as owner, the Supreme Court found this an 
irrelevant circumstance for bankruptcy creditors. 
Later legal theory cites the case as grounds for two facts of Norwegian bankruptcy law; 1) the 
estate is limited to de facto belongings of the debtor,66 and 2) the bankruptcy creditors’ good 
faith and the debtor’s apparent authority are irrelevant considerations in determining the 
scope of the Norwegian bankruptcy estate.67 In other words, good faith is no precondition for 
creditors extinguishing competing property rights. 
Hidden relativity 
While creditor recovery under the unitary approach to property transfer is usually a matter of 
finding out who is the rightful owner, the functionalist approach used in the Nordic 
recognises that several people may hold competing property rights. Who prevails depends on 
the conflict, and enjoying legal protection against a subsequent purchaser does necessarily 
imply that one has protection against a bankruptcy estate. 
Initially, the wording “belongs to” (“tilhører”) suggests that solving property disputes in 
Norway is simply a matter of identifying the rightful owner. However, the preparatory works 
of the Act reject § 2-2 as providing much of a guideline: 
“[A] provision of this nature cannot draw up any specific line for the right to 
recovery versus a third party; here, the rules on apparent authority, third-party protection 
[“rettsvern”] and avoidance apply, as well as the evidence rules”.68 
Generally, the third-party conflicts are categorised as variants of two main types commonly 
known as “legal predecessor conflicts” and “double succession conflicts”.  
3.3.2 Legal predecessor conflicts: Insolvent buyer 
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In short, legal predecessor conflicts are conflicts wherein party C derives his right from party 
B, before B’s legal predecessor A claims to be the rightful owner, contending C’s derivative 
right. The guiding principle is the nemo dat principle; that one may only transfer rights equal 
to or less than one’s own. The question is whether the B’s predecessor or successor should 
prevail. 
In bankruptcy situations, the situation arises where the buyer goes bankrupt, commonly 
referred to as the “into the estate conflict” (“inn i boet-konflikten”). The name summarises 
the main problem: whether or not the sold asset has already passed into the buyer’s estate by 
becoming property of the debtor under the Creditors Recovery Act § 2-2. If the asset still 
belongs to predecessor A, estate C can derive no right to satisfaction from B. 
 
Much can be said of the specific time of such transfer, as its ascertaining relies on the type of 
sale and individual circumstances of the case.69 This account will outline the general criteria’s 
content rather than their more specific application.  
“Handed over”: The relation between separation, stoppage and termination 
The Creditors Recovery Act § 7-2 stipulates that where one party “lacks the funds to fulfil his 
part of a mutually committing contract”, the counterparty has a right to “withhold its 
performance” if not yet “dispatched from the place of delivery” or, after dispatch, “hinder 
that it is handed over to the debtor or his estate until security is provided for the 
performance”. 
While this right to stoppage in transit presupposes that the goods have yet to reach the buyer, 
goods that have already been “handed over” under § 7-2 may be returned to seller by 
terminating the contract under § 7-7 (1), which provides such a right ether when the estate 
                                                












does not assume or fulfil the contract according to § 7-5. However, § 7-7 (2) dictates that a 
party who “prior to initiation of composition or bankruptcy” has “partially or fully delivered 
his consideration” may only terminate with regards to delivered movables if the contract had 
a valid clause on a right to return. The Security Interest Act § 3-22 prescribes that if the seller 
has  “retained ownership to the sold object until the purchase money (…) is fully paid, or a 
right to take the sold object back upon defaulted payment, the relationship shall be regarded 
as an agreement on salgspant [a purchase money security interest]”.70 Therefore, movables 
sold without a retention of title or purchase money security interest clause, can only be 
repossessed by seller if they were not “delivered” at the time bankruptcy was initiated, 
namely when the “order on initiation of bankruptcy [proceedings] was declared” pursuant to 
§ 1-4. Although the criterion “delivered” deviates from “handed over” in § 7-2, the 
preparatory works to § 7-7 maintain that “[i]f it concerns delivery of movable goods, the 
determining [question] must be whether the fulfilment has come so far that stoppage is 
precluded under the rules in § 7-2”.71  
In other words, goods already “handed over” to the buyer before the bankruptcy declaration 
may only be returned to the seller under retention of title/purchase money security interest 
clauses. Thus, the essential factor for the unsecured seller’s right to repossess goods sold to 
an insolvent buyer is whether the goods were “handed over” under § 7-2 pre-bankruptcy. Yet, 
as Lilleholt notes, the connection to the stoppage right does not necessarily make stoppage an 
accurate description for the seller’s right in bankruptcy; the question of stoppage right pre-
bankruptcy is merely the means to determine the seller’s possible right to separation post-
bankruptcy.72 The general application of the stoppage right and harmonisation efforts imply 
that the law of obligations’ other rules concerning the cut-off point for stoppage rights, i.e. 
the Norwegian Sale of Goods Act § 61 (2), are believed largely to correspond with the 
Creditors Recovery Act.73  
Hence, the question of whether an insolvent buyer’s estate may claim the asset, disregards the 
term ‘ownership’, focusing on the estate deriving its rights from the buyer, here restricted by 
an obligatory right to stop performance (stoppage in transitu) or terminate the contract. The 
                                                
70 See sub-chapter 4.2.1. 
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nemo dat principle is apparent here; where the buyer must yield to the seller’s repossession, 
so must the creditors. Notably, the Norwegian problem corresponds to the Chinese Enterprise 
Law article 39 stoppage, although China seemingly apply the general delivery requirement 
whereas Norway applies a different term altogether. 
When are goods “handed over”? 
The wording “handed over” indicates a physical transfer of goods, and it must be rather clear 
that where the seller has exclusive physical possession to the goods, they are not “handed 
over” to the buyer. Contrariwise, where the buyer has exclusive physical possession, it is 
similarly obvious that they are. Here, possession provides the necessary degree of notoritet 
and public notice.  
The more pressing questions relate to goods in no one’s exclusive possession and goods in 
the possession of a third party, where the solution is less obvious. Local sales, shipment sales 
and sales where the buyer obtains the goods at the seller’s place of business are subject to 
different rules. Still, the key question is generally which of the parties that can be most 
closely identified with the possessor or location of the goods.74 To maintain public notice and 
notoritet, one should deduce this association from objective, observable facts apparent to the 
outsider. 
1) Local sales or shipment sales: Where the asset is to be sent to a location or an area “to 
which the seller normally undertakes to bring such goods”, it is a ‘local sale’ (“plasskjøp”), 
and ‘delivery’ with regards to passing of risk happens “when the asset is received there”, cf. 
the Norwegian Sale of Goods Act § 7 (1).75 If the asset “is otherwise to be sent to the buyer 
(shipment sale)”, delivery happens upon the asset being “handed over” to the transporter or, 
where the seller transports the asset himself, the buyer, cf. § 7 (2).  
However, neither case necessarily implies that the goods are “handed over to the buyer” 
under the Creditors Recovery Act § 7-2.  
From the cases Rt-1907-771 and Rt-1932-304, it is clear that goods stored in customs are still 
under the seller’s stoppage right. The same is generally believed to be the case while the 
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goods are in the transporter’s possession or storage after arrival, unless in cases of long-term 
storage on the buyer’s behalf.76 Truyen remarks how independent transporters are usually 
hired or otherwise associated with the seller, whereas the buyer being the closest party to the 
transporter is more of an exception. Therefore, the transporter’s possession will typically 
imply that the seller has some degree of disposal over the goods, and that they are not 
“handed over” to the buyer. Provisions on the seller-transporter relationship in special forms 
of shipment77 typically provide the seller with disposal rights until surrendering goods to the 
buyer.78 Here, the cut-off point for the stoppage right is later than contractual delivery. 
Andenæs maintains that the buyer even ordering the transport might be insufficient for his 
identification with the transporter.79 However, where the transporter answers to or takes 
substantial orders from the buyer due to agreement or usual practice, it might imply the buyer 
disposing over the goods so that they must be considered as “handed over”.80 
Alternatively, the goods might be at a location independent from either party or their 
associates, yet accessible to both. In Rt-1971-549 (Dokka Bruk), the seller had delivered 
timber to a drop-off point along a road in the woods, where they remained until the buyer’s 
bankruptcy. The place was neither the seller’s nor the buyer’s, and yet accessible to both. The 
Supreme Court emphasised several aspects of the legal relationship: The seller was to 
supervise the timber, inform the buyer of deterioration and remove snow to facilitate buyer’s 
access. Importantly, “the individual buyer had no exclusive disposal of the location”.  
From this, one may deduce that both the seller’s continued cooperation after drop-off, besides 
the buyer lacking exclusive disposal, were instrumental factors in the conclusion: The seller 
still had a stoppage right, and the bankruptcy estate could not seize the goods.81  
This promotes public notice, since the seller’s continued responsibility for the timber and the 
buyer’s lack of exclusive disposal left the current disposal of the timber undeterminable to 
other interested parties. Truyen also mentions a noteworthy argument: Where the buyer does 
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not appear as owner to goods he has yet to pay for, the creditors have less reason to expect 
satisfaction through said goods.82  
While the case was solved through the now repealed Bankruptcy Law of 1963 § 40, the 
preparatory works of the Creditors Recovery Act presume the solution to be the same under 
the Sale of Goods Act § 39,83 indicating relevance to the criterion “handed over”. Truyen and 
Andenæs agree that exclusive disposal and apparent ownership are thus relevant factors under 
the Creditors Recovery Act § 7-2.84 
In the other timber case, Rt-1974-879 (Statlandbruket), a seller undertook transport of the 
timber by sea at the buyer’s expense. When the timber lay on the beach, the buyer went 
bankrupt. The Supreme Court reiterated the factors of exclusive possession and the goods’ 
external appearance as the buyer’s. Although the buyer could retrieve the timber and the 
timber was commingled with timber from another supplier of the buyer, the seller’s right to 
withhold the timber from the estate remained. The Court remarked that the seller had 
obtained permission from the landowner to store the goods, raised poles marking the spot and 
supervised the timber to some degree.  
Rt-1973-95 (Krogstad Cellulosefabrik) even recognised the seller’s right to withhold timber 
left on the buyer’s premises due to their longstanding custom of such timber being outside the 
buyer’s right to disposal until measuring. While less apparent from the outside, the court 
emphasised that such practice was reasonable and established. Furthermore, the majority vote 
found that “[w]hen the purchase money was unpaid and undue before measuring, and when 
the measuring in itself gives the relationship notoritet, I do not find it questionable with 
regards to third-party protection that also the creditors will have to respect the parties’ 
arrangements”. Yet, the arguments indicate that if such practice should be accepted, it must 
maintain a certain notoritet. 
In Rt-1997-1438 (Metos), the parties established storage for the seller as a separated part of 
the buyer’s storage. The Court did not acknowledge the seller’s alleged stoppage right, noting 
that one “must under any circumstance demand clarity and notoritet (…), particularly 
regarding disposal and control – demands that are not satisfied in this case”. 
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Truyen finds that some “confirming action” from the buyer, exercising the disposal, will 
generally be necessary for the right to be lost.85 Receiving “transport documents”, such as 
bills of lading, is not sufficient for precluding the right, in light of explicit statements in the 
Sale of Goods Act § 61, which corresponds to the rule in § 7-2.86 
2) Collection sales 
The Sale of Goods Act § 6 on collection sales (“hentekjøp”), sales where the buyer collects 
the goods at the seller’s place of business or another location where the goods are kept “ready 
for collection”, stipulates that the goods are “delivered when taken over by the buyer”. If the 
seller is present at the time the buyer collects the goods, loss of stoppage right will occur 
simultaneously with delivery. Although the seller’s physical possession will here tend to 
correspond to his stoppage right, legal theory has taken that exceptions are conceivable.87 Are 
the goods left in the open, they are “handed over” upon collection, as when stored by a third 
party.88 Where the buyer is to extract them from nature, such as felling trees, they are 
“handed over” upon such extraction, even if they remain on the seller’s premises.89 
3.3.3 Double successor conflicts: Insolvent seller 
‘Double successor conflicts’ (“dobbeltsuksesjonskonflikter”) is the general term for conflicts 
wherein both parties B and C derive their competing rights from party A. The guiding 
principle here is the prior tempore principle, dictating that the first in time is the best in right, 
and the question is whether successor B or C achieved protection of rights first. The 
necessary action ensuring such protection is determined with due consideration of the need 
for notoritet and public notice. 
In insolvency, this conflict arises when the A sells movables to acquirer C and upon A’s 
subsequent bankruptcy, his estate B asserts rights to the sold goods, alleging that they belong 
to the debtor. It becomes a question of whether the buyer or the estate obtained legal 
protection first time, yet the question remains: First in time for what?90 The solution of these 
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conflicts (called “ut av boet-konflikter”, literally “out of estate conflicts”) relies on which 
action the law deems sufficient for legal protection against a third party. As the estate 
creditors’ satisfaction right does not require any measures to obtain third-party protection 
(they are the third party), the question is more precisely this: Did buyer C obtain third-party 
protection before the bankruptcy declaration established B’s claim to creditor satisfaction 
under the Creditors Recovery Act § 2-2? If not, the estate may seize the asset. 
 
Legal grounds 
As indicated under 3.3.1, the Creditors Recovery Act § 2-2 gives no indication of when one 
ought to regard something as debtor’s property, and can hardly be said to prescribe solutions 
for when third-party protection is acquired. Moreover, the examination below will show that 
applicable case law is dated and scarce.  
Under such lack of clear rules, the policy considerations outlined in sub-chapter 3.1.3 become 
something more than legislative purposes under which the law can be interpreted; they 
become essential guiding principles in ascertaining what the rule is (or ought to be, as the 
divide between lex lata and lex ferenda tends to become less distinguishable in such 
circumstances).91 As Lilleholt formulates, the considerations of efficient commerce, equal 
treatment of creditors and prevention of creditor fraud “must lie as the fundament for he who 
shall make an assertion on the question of the buyer’s protection against the seller’s 
creditors”,92 and due to the question’s scarce legal framework, these considerations “are king 
of the hill”.93 
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Relevant case law 
The question of the buyer’s protection of rights to movables against the seller’s creditors has 
hardly been a subject in Supreme Court cases in the past 105 years. To this day, the 
interpretations of the law mostly relate to two cases from 1910 and 1912, a somewhat special 
case in 1990, supplemented with possible analogies from perfection rules for security 
interests and the policy considerations mentioned.  
In Rt-1910-231 (the Cow Case), a farmer sold cattle to a butcher, who paid a tentative price. 
They agreed that the seller retained the cattle until milking. As milking affects the slaughter 
weight, the price would be adjusted accordingly upon subsequent weighing before delivery. 
Against a three-judge minority voting for transfer upon contractual conclusion, the majority 
of four deemed the transaction to “lack the characteristics of an actual property transfer”. 
They emphasised the seller’s continued possession over several months “in his interest”, that 
the lacking transfer of disposal necessitated later delivery “for effectuating an actual transfer 
of ownership” and ruled in favour of the seller’s estate. As Lilleholt notes, these arguments 
related to a current theoretical adherence to a German delivery principle, although with a 
restriction of constitutum possessorium to circumstances where the seller was not to “dispose 
as an owner” over the goods.94 
The result was the opposite in Rt-1912-263 (the Scrap Metal Case), wherein a shipyard had 
agreed that scrap metal sold to a buyer was to remain in a separate pile on the shipyards 
premises until the buyer’s retrieval. The agreement transferred scrap metal accumulated 
throughout the year 1908 in its entirety. When the shipyard went bankrupt in 1909, the buyer, 
who had paid for 94 out of the remaining 100 tonnes, had only collected portions of the pile. 
A majority of five ruled in favour of the buyer’s acquisition of ownership, whereas two 
judges referred to the Cow Case as grounds for the estate’s right to satisfaction. The majority 
cited the parties’ intention of the metal remaining in the pile at the buyer’s “cost and risk”, 
the seller’s lack of right to remove or retransfer its contents and that the bill for the contents 
constituted “sufficient specification” in light of the nature of the goods and the legal 
relationship. Reference to “specification” correlates with the English consensus principle’s 
minimum requirements.95 
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Rt-1909-734 converges in this respect. A seller agreed to deliver 300 dozens of timber to two 
lumber traders in exchange for logging rights, some established prior to delivery, others after. 
A deposit was paid, and the timber was marked with the acquirers’ marking axe. Upon the 
seller’s failure to deliver, the parties altered the agreement so that they were instead to own 
certain tree trunks with an overall value corresponding to the deposit, whereas delivery of the 
remainder was postponed until the next year. After finding that the parties intended for the 
ownership to pass immediately upon the second agreement due to them using word “transfer” 
(“overdra”), the Court rejected the allegation that it was an avoidable pro forma arrangement 
for securing existing debt but a modification of the price and corresponding delivery of wood. 
Furthermore, they found the wording “the timber transferred to us today” sufficiently distinct 
from the remaining wood. While the decision does not assess “the general question of 
conditions for transfer of ownership to movables”, the arguments combined indicate the 
Court finding a genuine sales agreement over sufficiently individualised goods to be 
sufficient in the specific case.96  
The third case, Rt-1990-59 (Myra Båt) concerned whether an owner of a construction project 
owned building materials supplied by the contractor. The standard contract governing the 
construction stipulated that the owner’s instalments were to pay for the materials, and the 
majority of the Court found that “the conditions for transfer of property are here fulfilled” 
and that the “consideration for individualisation is fulfilled by the materials being brought to 
the construction site”. It is notable that the case concerned a large construction contract and 
that the goods were on the owner’s premises, differentiating the case from the 
aforementioned. 
Theoretical interpretation: ‘the interest doctrine’ 
It might seem difficult to reconcile the rulings under one general rule. Yet, Brækhus & 
Hærem presented an influential effort in Norsk Tingsrett in 1964.97 What was certain from 
the cases was their deduction that delivery was at least sufficient for providing the buyer 
third-party protection.98 Yet, the cases showed that delivery might not be necessary in all 
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cases. After examining case law, legal theoretical shifts from a consensus principle to a 
traditio principle and how a purported sales contracts could serve the purpose of securing a 
loan, circumventing the possession rule as a condition for perfecting pledges (see 5.2 and 
5.5.2), Brækhus & Hærem found the purpose of possession as condition for perfection of a 
pledge to be a natural starting point.99 In brief, they argued that sales without transfer of 
possession or disposal would facilitate concealed agreements on non-possessory security; a 
scheme Norwegian law regarded with scepticism due to the difficulty of verifying that the 
parties have not extended its scope or antedated the agreement to favour one creditor before 
the others. Equal treatment of creditors, public notice and notoritet are major concerns. 
Another argument relating to equal treatment of creditors was that where a purchase pays in 
advance, it resembles other credit arrangements, so that one should view the purchaser as an 
unsecured creditor. Brækhus & Hærem regarded this argument with some scepticism.100 They 
found prepayment to resemble credit where the goods are undeliverable, either due to them 
being unfinished or the seller’s continued need for the them, yet less so when the non-
delivery is due to the purchasers unwillingness or inability to collect the assets. Cases where 
the seller undertakes transport, fell somewhere in between.101 
However, they held manufacturing contracts in a special position, as the manufacturer’s 
acquisition of materials for the individual contract is a considerable financial risk that 
legitimises advance payments or instalments. Furthermore, they argued that larger 
manufacturing contracts often are concluded by tender, and pose less of a risk of creditor 
fraud due to the visibility of contractual conclusion. Moreover, the financial risks and need 
for payment prior to delivery indicated that the policy consideration of efficient commerce 
outweighed the qualms of abandoning third-party protection by delivery.102 
Based on their assessment de lege ferenda, Brækhus & Hærem concluded that the buyer has 
legal protection when it only relies on himself when he obtains possession, where only 
additional work remains on otherwise finished goods and, possibly, where only the seller’s 
transport remains:  
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“In short, but somewhat inaccurately, this can be expressed so that the buyer is protected if 
the seller has the thing in his [the buyer’s] interest”.103  
Brækhus & Hærem did not assert this reconciliation of case law, theory and policy 
considerations, later to be known ‘the interest doctrine’ (“interesselæren”),104 as definite law. 
They found that “present law is so inconclusive that one must assume that the courts will be 
rather free [in their discretion]”, and that there “is no unconditional requirement of delivery, 
yet neither will the agreement always be enough”.105 
The inarguable merit of the doctrine is that it reconciled seemingly contradicting case law 
while taking necessary reservations for certain commercial transactions.  
Later theorists have, with some reservations, largely regarded delivery as a general 
requirement with certain modifications, such as for the seller’s retained possession in the 
buyer’s interest and exceptions for minor additional duties or manufacturing contracts.106 In 
those exceptions, the goods must merely be individualised or specified to adhere to the 
specificity principle of property rights.107 The latter exception also reconciles the doctrine 
with the Myra Båt Case. 
This doctrine somewhat resembles the Chinese solution, albeit with the important 
modification that the interest assessment does not leave the reasons for the seller’s retained 
possession to the parties’ decision, such as constitutum possessorium.  
Criticism of the doctrine 
There are clear disadvantages to the doctrine, as it is unpredictable in various respects. One 
might ask when only ‘additional work’ remains to an otherwise finished good, when 
something is only ‘in the buyer’s interest’, when a manufacturing contract is large enough to 
warrant exceptions from delivery requirements or when the goods under such contracts are 
sufficiently ‘individualised’.  
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While the lattermost question is subject to the courts’ discretion even under consensus 
jurisdictions, the other problems arise due to an uncertain doctrine under which the parties 
can hardly take measures to ensure protection, other than transferring possession. The unclear 
scope of application could potentially hamper development of new transaction methods. 
Moreover, Hauge has questioned the legal grounds for deducing a delivery requirement. She 
asserts that if the seller has paid his consideration, a right legitimately acquired108 under a 
sales contract perfects already upon individualisation or specification of assets. In her view, 
third-party protection of rights to goods that the seller retains in the buyer’s interest, applies 
in absence of sufficiently individualising agreement.109 If correct, delivery is only necessary 
when the contract does not concern sufficiently specific assets and the seller has an interest in 
their possession. 
Being the most extensive analysis of the subject since the formulation of the interest doctrine, 
Hauge’s account is far too many-faceted to cover in full. I will limit my description to certain 
key elements that illustrate how one cannot take the delivery requirement for granted, and 
will not detail the question of how her alternative approach should be specifically applied. 
While Hauge acknowledges that purported sales contracts actually securing debt should be 
characterised as circumventions of the perfection rules for pledges, so that legal protection is 
not acquired before delivery, she contends such analogies where the contract serves a 
legitimate sales purpose, as it has another economic function110 and normally will manifest its 
legitimacy through possession at some point. Where that has yet to happen, she argues the 
fact as a relevant factor in judging evidence. 111 
While she recognises prepayments as a possible indication of a seller’s economy failing, she 
finds it less indicative than a security transaction, therefore deeming the analogy from 
pledges inappropriate.112 Likewise, she advises caution in deducting a general rule from the 
rules in the Security Interest Act § 3-7 on third-party protection of bona fide acquisition of 
objects under a floating charge, finding them at best to be a supportive argument to otherwise 
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solid legal grounds. 113  Moreover, she rejects appliying the rule in the Creditors Recovery 
Act § 7-13 on only “fulfilled” gift promises enjoying protection, unless the sales price is low 
enough that the sale has a significant gift element.114  
Moreover, the preparatory works for the Promissory Note Act115 rejected a delivery 
requirement for legal protection of rights to negotiable promissory notes because requiring 
delivery would not “be in the best accordance with the tenets that we otherwise apply to 
transfer of movables”. Hauge notes that although they carry limited normative value as a 
representation of the legislature’s current opinion on the matter, the preparatory works 
nuance the view of the delivery requirement as verified truth in the past century, and she 
holds it as an overlooked fact that the consensus on protection upon delivery spread only after 
the interest doctrine.116 
As to case law, she finds the timber case in Rt-1909-734 as recognition of third-party 
protection upon contract over specified assets, and that one might see the requirement of 
delivery in the Cow Case as a default rule due to the cattle’s weight being too unspecific 
under the agreement.117 Hilde sees the case as restricting the degree of autonomy under a 
consensus principle,118 an interpretation resonating with the Scrap Metal Case, which 
explicitly referred to “sufficient specification” of the goods. Moreover, the judges mostly 
concurred with the city court’s reasons for their judgment, which stated a need for 
commercial autonomy to conclude transactions fitting the circumstances, finding that 
separation of a clearly defined quantum into a pile the seller was unauthorised to dispose of, 
hardly warranted further measures for obtaining legal protection.119 
As to the Myra Båt Case, Hauge makes the reservation that it differs from the general 
question here, yet deducts that “it is of general relevance that the Supreme Court by the 
decision recognises a contractual clause for transfer of ownership with effect to third-party 
protection”.120 
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Yet, as she notes,121 the broad consensus on delivery at least serving as the main rule might in 
itself carry some authority as legal grounds for future cases, especially when considering the 
doctrine’s longevity in light of its subsequent practical application and the need for 
predictability. To what extent Hauge will be proven right in future legal development, is 
therefore hard to say. Nonetheless, she concludes that at present, one can hardly deduce a 
delivery principle from the sources of law. 
Current and future prospects for the delivery principle 
While the consensus principle’s merits of enabling flexible commercial transactions are 
rather clear, any future deviations from the delivery principle will nonetheless rely on the 
extent at which the legislature or judicature find a consensus principle with a minimum 
requirement of ascertaining the goods to provide a sufficient degree of notoritet and public 
notice. Below, I will examine to what extent the alleged deficiencies of the consensus model 
remain an issue today. At the very least, these deliberations can be considered arguments de 
lege ferenda, yet as the legal grounds are scarce and ambiguous, they can arguably also be 
seen as arguments de lege lata.122 
One objection could be asserted against the basic fundament for the doctrine or the delivery 
requirements in general: On the need for transfer of possession as a safeguard for notoritet, 
Brækhus & Hærem state that delivery “does not provide any fully adequate protection against 
later antedating”, as delivery only proves the possessor of having “some right or another”, 
and not its contents. Furthermore, they note: “Neither does one know for certain when the 
delivery has taken place”. When they still find delivery as the most appropriate measure 
against creditor fraud, it is because “there usually is no better way to ensure notoritet (…)”,123  
and at present, Norway lacks a movable goods register sorted by asset and not by person (a 
“realregister”, as opposed to a “personalregister”).  
Much has happened to transaction methods since 1964. While electronic manipulation of 
digital contracts sent by e-mail is certainly possible, the development of i.e. blockchain 
technology allows for data verification even in absence of a central supervisory institution. 
While not a current alternative, it is conceivable that such technologies can serve as platforms 
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for concluding contracts, making payments or registering acquisitions without the 
inconvenience and cost of public notary functions. At present, the blockchain technology is 
being explored by the land registry authority (Lantmäteriet) in Sweden,124 a jurisdiction 
where registration and delivery are the only acceptable third-party protection acts to date, 
pursuant to the Swedish Sale of Movables Act § 1.125 
Although such future prospects are hardly strong arguments for notoritet in absence of 
delivery today, certain current technologies are. As Hauge notes, the risk of a pro forma sales 
agreement is less obvious in today’s context of digital payment than in 1964.126  
The legal grounds for the delivery-based doctrine are scarce and inconclusive, even in the 
eyes of its inventors. Within the accordingly wide argumentative margin, Brækhus & Hærem 
based their doctrine upon concrete assessment of risk and need for verifiability, as one should 
today. 
It is therefore highly relevant how modern transaction methods maintain a higher degree of 
verifiability than those of 1964 and, arguably, what transfer of possession can add. While one 
can often manipulate electronic information, Brækhus & Hærem were entirely clear on 
similar risks of manipulation and antedating being inherent to a delivery rule. 
Unless future legislation allows for simplified registration measures, the technological 
arguments relate primarily to notoritet. One might therefore argue that protection upon 
transfer in possession provides more public notice a contractual agreement over specific 
assets. Yet, one might contend the extent of insight a creditor has in the debtor’s possessions 
in the course of business, at least in minor transactions. Therefore, one might question 
whether the additional publicity from possession requirements is substantial enough to 
outweigh the consideration for efficient commerce. Moreover, a requirement of ascertaining 
goods could be interpreted strictly enough that if the creditors were to look into their debtor’s 
possessions, they would be able to discover goods designated for a third party. As such, lack 
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https://www.lantmateriet.se/contentassets/6874bc3048ab42d6955e0f5dd9a84dcf/blockkedjan-framtidens-
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of public notice is less of an argument against protection upon ascertaining than an argument 
against protection upon lenient ascertaining. 
One can hardly regard the current, exceptional ascertaining requirement in Norway as very 
strict. In describing the exceptions to their interest doctrine, Brækhus & Hærem detail the 
remaining condition of specifying the asset or individualising it by separation where it is 
generic: they hold that exact measuring can hardly be a requirement in light of the Scrap 
Metal Case and the timber case in Rt-1909-734. Instead, they deem separation of an 
“approximate amount” sufficient,127 and doubt whether the buyer must be notified of the 
separation.128 Yet, they maintain, one should require “rather strict requirements for the 
evidence of the individualisation having taken place prior to the bankruptcy”.129 There is 
consensus on the individualisation requirement being relevant to circumstance in the sense 
that it must appear “normal” in light of the usual way of separating such assets.130 It is 
somewhat uncertain whether the separation must be binding on the seller in the sense of 
irreversibility.131 
Conclusions 
It is difficult to make conclusive statements about the current conditions for protecting 
acquisition of movables against the seller’s creditors. One can hardly disregard the 
widespread belief that delivery is generally required unless the seller only retains possession 
for the sake of the buyer, the goods are mostly ready for delivery or prepayments have been 
made under large-scale manufacturing contracts. Yet, these deductions are made from case 
law that are also reconcilable with protection at the conclusion of a contract where the 
purchased goods are sufficiently specified, as Hauge holds. While the interest doctrine of 
Brækhus & Hærem is certainly not undisputed, it seems that one can hardly rely on anything 
but delivery being sufficient, except under the widely accepted exceptions.132  
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Comparing the traditional Norwegian approach with China, the traditional view is similar in 
its main rule of delivery. The permitted exceptions, however, are more restrictive: Whereas 
constitutum possessorium allows parties to agree that the seller retains possession in either 
party’s interest, traditional Norwegian doctrine only allows retention in the seller’s interest 
where large-scale manufacturing necessitates advance payment. 
One might argue that the respective flaws of both a strict traditio principle and a lenient 
consensus principle pose less of a challenge than the unpredictability owing to the lack of 
clarity and the interest doctrine’s discretionally determined scope. Then again, the 
ascertaining requirement of a consensus principle warrants uncertainties in its own right.133 
If the legislature were to re-examine the legal framework, the flaws of the consensus 
principle are arguably less pronounced in the digital age than in 1964, and it is conceivable 
that lawmakers may consider this. If technologies such as the blockchain or ordinary 
electronic payments through financial institutions can provide adequate authentication when 
applied in the transaction itself, notoritet could be achieved without additional third-party 
protection requirements, instead making third-party protection a question of evidence. 
However, digital improvement of the registration framework could potentially make a 
statutory rule of registering acquisition of movables more attractive as an alternative for high-
value acquisitions. That system has long been in place for motor vehicles, ships and aircrafts. 
While Sweden’s general registration alternative for movables is rarely used,134 their 
exploration of the blockchain technology at least suggests a curiosity towards applying recent 
financial technology to the framework of property registration.  
To what extent Hauge’s analysis forebodes a paradigm shift, remains to be seen. Judging by 
the frequency at which such conflicts have proceeded to the Supreme Court, the uncertainties 
seldom result in major litigation, and it seems less than likely for case law to clarify the 
matter in the near future. For now, the cautious acquirer of movable property would be wise 
in taking delivery at first opportunity.  
3.3.4 What are the consequences of contractual invalidity? 
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As with China, acquisition under an invalid contract will often result in the original owner 
having a restitution claim to the individual asset. Marthinussen holds that the principle of 
causality “lies clearly enough as a basic structure also in our Norwegian property law”.135 see 
Marthinussen 2010, p. 36 with further references. He further nuances the degree of causality 
on p. 38. However, Færstad & Lilja136 maintain that under the functional property transfer 
model in Norway, it makes little sense to speak of a causality principle between the 
obligatory rights and the property rights, as Norway does not designate certain rights as 
proprietary. Although Norwegian law often presupposes valid agreement as grounds for 
transfer of property, the causal relationship is a result rather than an argument from which 
one may deduce the result. In principle, the question of whether invalidity renders property 
transfer ineffective should not be assessed generally, but with regards to the nature of the 
conflicting rights and their holders.137 Here, I will only outline to what extent validity in 
general can be asserted against the estate. A question not detailed here is whether the 
individual invalidity rule gives rights to the asset itself or to monetary compensation. 138 
Where the buyer is insolvent, one must determine whether the seller may assert the 
agreement’s invalidity as grounds that the buyer’s estate may not seize the goods. It is 
generally accepted that where a seller could assert the claim against the debtor himself, he 
may also assert it against the debtor’s creditors.139 Some invalidity causes only take effect if 
the other party was in bad faith, and if so, the estate will only have to yield where the debtor 
was in bad faith.  
Where the seller is insolvent, the question is whether the estate may assert contractual 
invalidity against the buyer. Hauge holds it as generally accepted that the estate “has the same 
opportunity to assert a cause of invalidity as the insolvent debtor would have himself”.140   
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While the term ‘causal transfer’ is seldom used explicitly,141 Norwegian law, notwithstanding 
law on bona fide acquisition, often presupposes a causal link between contractual validity and 
effective transfer of property. 
                                                






4 Retention of title clauses:  
Who is the owner? 
4.1 China 
4.1.1 Retention of title or mortgage right? 
When “the debtor possesses assets not his own” at the time the People’s court accepts the 
bankruptcy application, “the owner of such assets may take back the assets through the 
bankruptcy administrator unless otherwise prescribed by this Law” under the Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law article 38. Since the rightful owner “may take back” the property, this 
statute clearly addresses the situation where the goods are already in the buyer’s possession. 
If the insolvent debtor has leased the property, he is not the owner142 and the administrator 
shall return the property to the lessor. However, it is common in sale of goods to agree upon 
so-called ‘retention of title’ clauses that allegedly keep ownership on the seller’s hands until 
the buyer has fully paid the agreed price. If so, the seller could, in principle, be entitled to the 
asset’s full value upon default. 
Whereas Norwegian law deems title retention clauses as establishing mere security interests 
over unpaid goods,143 Chinese legislation seems to imply actual title retention by leaving 
legal ownership with the seller until the clause’s conditions for ownership transfer are met. 
Namely, the Chinese Contract Law article 134 dictates how “concerned parties may in 
[a/the]144 purchase and sale contract agree that if the buyer fails to pay the price or other 
obligations, the ownership to the subject matter remains in the seller”.  
The wording “the ownership (…) remains” leaves little ambiguity: The seller would 
undoubtedly have a proprietary claim to sold assets where the buyer defaulted due to 
insolvency and his bankruptcy estate attempted to seize such assets. 
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The Bankruptcy Provisions (II) article 2 supports this impression.145 The provision states that 
“the following assets shall not be identified as debtor’s assets”, before listing several specific 
types of assets, among them “assets that the debtor has not yet obtained ownership to under a 
title retention transaction”. Seeing as article 3 further stipulates that the people’s courts “shall 
identify specific assets upon which the debtor has legally established a security interest as 
debtor’s assets”, Chinese legislation draws a clear line between title retention clauses and 
security interest agreements. Under a Chinese title retention clause, the property right does 
indeed remain with the seller. 
However, this only remains the case when the title retention clause is legally established and 
the seller has not lost the right to demand return of the asset. Below, I will examine whether 
there are conditions for title retention clauses enjoying legal validity and third-party 
protection, and under what circumstances the seller might lose his right to repossess the sold 
asset upon the buyer’s default. 
4.1.2 Establishment and perfection 
Whether there are conditions for title retention clauses’ enforceability is a question with at 
least two facets. First, one might imagine that title retention clauses may only be agreed in 
writing to be effective between the parties. Second, the law might require a certain action of 
perfection for the clause to have legal protection against interests of third parties.  
The title retention statutes are silent on whether the clause must be concluded in writing. 
Naturally, written form significantly aids efforts to prove that the clause’s legitimacy. The 
topic at hand, however, is not evidence rules, but whether written form is a formal 
requirement even when the contents of the clause are provable through other means. It is hard 
to deduct any such requirement from the law, though there appears to be a requirement for 
the title retention being part of the original sales contract:  
The Contract Law article 134 stipulates that “concerned parties may in [a/the] purchase and 
sale contract agree that if the buyer fails to pay the price or other obligations, the ownership 
to the subject matter remains in the seller”. The wording “in [a/the] purchase and sale 
contract” (“在买卖合同中”) hints at a legislative intent for the clause to be part of the 
                                                






underlying agreement, especially given the definition of a sales contract in article 130: “a 
contract wherein the seller transfers ownership of the subject matter to the buyer, and the 
buyer pays the price”. A title retention agreement makes little sense without a sales 
agreement, and it would be illogical to conclude a title retention agreement after the seller 
transferred ownership under the original agreement. By then, the ownership would no longer 
be the seller’s to retain.  
However, if the contract was concluded but the object undelivered, the seller would still have 
ownership under the Contract article 133 and the Property Law articles 6 and 23. In such 
cases, the question supplementary title retention agreements could arise. Recognition of such 
schemes would not resonate well with the wording “in [a/the] sales contract” of the Contract 
Law article 134. Furthermore, the seller would already be contractually obliged to perform 
under the original contract, and if the buyer signed the supplementary title retention clause, in 
reality he would forfeit existing rights to the subject matter.  
Article 34 of the Bankruptcy Provisions (II) also seems to support the claim that a sales 
contract must contain the retention clause if there is to be one. It is slightly more ambiguous, 
as it deems the contract incompletely performed where the two parties to a sales contract 
have “agreed in [a/the] contract” upon title retention. As the Chinese language does not 
employ definite articles before nouns, it is unclear whether the statute refers to a contract or 
the sales contract. In light of the Contract Law article 134 reiterating the term ‘sales contract’ 
in both instances, the logical conclusion seems to be that one cannot add supplementary 
conditions for transferring of ownership after agreeing on the transfer itself. The law is 
however unclear concerning this.  
The statutes are also silent as to whether there are other perfection requirements for title 
retention clauses. Wang, who led the work on one influential draft of the Property Law, 
seemingly takes this to imply that there are no perfection requirements. In his inquiry into 
uncertainties of Chinese title retention,146 he notes lacking clarification of several important 
questions in the Bankruptcy Provisions (II) and the Sales Contract Interpretation. These 
include the detailed scope of title retention clauses, the mechanisms of the buyer’s right to 
performance, detailed conditions and procedures for the seller to exercise the repossession 
right, and the problem in question: any procedure for registration of retained ownership. 
                                                






Wang states that “China has not stipulated provisions on this, and as this remains a rather 
controversial question, the Sales Contract Interpretation avoids the question”, before listing 
the drafters’ supposed reasons for why registration procedures are unnecessary for the inter 
partes effect, including promoting transactions, reducing their costs and protecting lawful 
interests of the concerned parties. Wang himself, holds that title retention clauses remain a 
sort of security interest without a method for ensuring public notice, and that registration 
procedures should be established for all relevant parties to be protected; the seller, the buyer 
and third parties. 
At present, title retention clauses seemingly do not require neither written agreement, though 
there seems to be an expectation of the clause being part of the underlying sales agreement, 
nor any other perfection acts. This is in stark contrast to the security interests that fall within 
the scope of the Chinese Guarantee Law.147 This does not imply that a title retention clause 
gives the seller an unconditional right to return of the goods upon the buyer’s default, as the 
clauses are subject to certain limitations. 
4.1.3 Termination 
While the Bankruptcy Provisions mentioned in subchapter 4.1.1 clearly leave ownership to 
assets under a valid title retention clause with the seller, they do not necessarily allow the 
seller to reclaim sold assets until the buyer has performed his obligations in full.  
It is noteworthy that retention of ownership only applies to movable property, according to 
article 34 of the Sales Contract Interpretation. This makes sense, as immovable property is 
subject to registration. Had title retention clauses been acknowledged for immovable 
property, they could undermine the registry’s reliability. 
Under the Sales Contract Interpretation article 36, two events terminate the owner’s right to 
repossession: 1) the buyer’s payment of 75 percent or more of the purchase money and 2) 
bona fide acquisition by third parties. 
  
                                                






75 percent payment 
Where the buyer has “paid 75 percent or more of the subject matter’s total price”, article 36 
of the Sales Contract Interpretation stipulates that the courts shall not sustain the seller’s 
claim to take back the asset. 
According to this provision, the remedy of taking the unpaid goods back through the estate 
administrator under the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law article 38 only applies to situations in 
which 74 percent or less of the total price is paid.  
One might object that such a rule is unnecessary for a balanced restitution, since the 
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law article 17 would entitle the buyer, and thereby the estate, to a 
refund of the purchase price in any case. However, one may argue that contractual 
performance is commercially favourable, rather than resorting to termination and restitution. 
Where mutual performance is nearing completion, there is all the less reason to terminate, 
and perhaps one should not see the rule primarily as a remedy for ensuring contractual 
balance, but as a vehicle for contractual fulfilment.  
However, bankruptcy administrators often have discretionary powers to terminate or continue 
contracts not yet fully performed, as Chinese administrators do under the Chinese Bankruptcy 
Law article 18.  Whether this authority applies to contracts with title retention clauses is 
resolved by article 34 of the Bankruptcy Provisions (II). Article 34 stipulates that where 
ownership under a title retention sale has yet to transfer when one party goes bankrupt, the 
courts shall deem the contract incompletely performed, and the administrator “has the right to 
decide whether to cancel or continue performance of the contract under article 18 of the 
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law”. 
This raises the question of whether the 75 percent limit binds the administrator. While the 
Sales Contract Interpretation from 2012 left this question unanswered, the later Bankruptcy 
Provisions (II) addressed it in detail:  
Under article 35, the administrator of a bankrupt seller may continue the original contract and 
reclaim the sold goods if the buyer defaults on payment, transfers or improperly disposes of 
the assets. However, third paragraph clearly states that the exceptions for both bona fide 
acquisition and for 75 percent payment apply to the administrator’s repossession right. While 






have, these limits to repossession are clear reiterations of the main rule of the estate being 
limited to the debtor’s own rights, resorting to payment or compensation where the asset 
cannot be returned. Under article 36, the administrator may also terminate the contract and 
repossess the property through the courts. Yet, in doing so, the buyer’s claim to his purchase 
money could become a priority claim (a ‘common benefit debt’ paid before unsecured 
creditors’ dividends), unless the buyer breached the contract. 
Where the buyer is bankrupt, article 37 authorises the administrator to continue the contract, 
making performance due from acceptance of the bankruptcy petition. Still, the 
administrator’s transfer, default or improper disposal would evoke the seller’s right to 
repossession, again limited by the exceptions for bona fide acquisition and 75 percent 
payment. As under article 36, non-returnable assets result in the seller having a priority claim. 
The administrator may also terminate the contract under article 38, entitling the seller to 
return of property, and to offset any loss to the asset’s value against the purchase price before 
returning the remaining price to the buyer’s estate. Should the loss exceed the purchase price, 
the courts will render the remaining loss a priority claim at the seller’s request. 
In sum, the interpretations of the Supreme People’s Court seemingly favour contractual 
fulfilment where the buyer has neared complete payment or established a third-party interest 
in the asset by means of sale or other unauthorised disposal. Where the administrator may 
cancel the contract and return assets, the provisions aim at full restitution of claims arising 
from the termination through priority rules. Although detailed in nature, the provisions still 
leave several matters unattended. Wang holds that future interpretations should address 
whether defaulted payment must consist of several instalments or persist for a certain amount 
of time to warrant repossession.148 He holds that a defaulting buyer should be entitled to a 
reminder and a redemption period. For now, the seller’s right to repossession seems hindered 
only by a bona fide third party and the 75 percent threshold. 
4.1.4 Are extended retention of title clauses possible? 
The German retention of title clauses come in three main varieties, ranging from the simple 
retention of title clause, to two categories of extended retentions of title that must be agreed 
                                                






specifically, giving the seller a better right than a simple retention clause would. Chinese 
property law’s Germanic origins could suggest similar extensions in China, and the 
paragraphs below will discuss whether such extensions exist. 
Retention against other claims: Erweiterte Eigentumsvorbehalt 
One category is the so-called erweiterte Eigentumsvorbehalt, under which the secured asset 
not only secures its purchase price, but also any other claim the seller may have against the 
buyer (Kontokurrentvorbehalt),149 or even claims against legal persons that the buyer is 
associated with (i.e. sister companies), although they are not parties to the contract 
(Konzernvorbehalt).150 
In Chinese law, one may debate whether the law is actually silent regarding similar 
constructs. The Contract Law article 134 lets the parties agree that ownership remains with 
the seller “if the buyer fails to pay the price or perform other obligations”. As the law only 
refers to the buyer’s performance, it seems unlikely that the parties may agree that ownership 
transfer depends on a third party’s performance.  
Still, one could imagine that the buyer’s obligations under the contract included both paying 
the purchase price, providing and fulfilling a guarantee for outstanding debt of a sister 
company under chapter 2 of the Guarantee Law and thereby circumventing the limitation 
through the “other obligations” alternative in the Contract Law article 134. This is unclear 
under applicable law, yet as the statutes seemingly stipulate retention and passing of title as 
effects to the contracting parties’ conduct, it seems unlikely for the law to permit the German 
Konzernvorbehalt. 
As to extension of the security to other claims between the contracting parties through a 
Kontokurrentvorbehalt, the wording “paying the price or other obligations” leaves more to 
uncertainty. One might argue from the context of stipulating the retention of title “in a sales 
contract” that “other obligations” refers to obligations under the same contract. Yet, the mere 
presence of an alternative condition for title retention besides failing to “pay the price” could 
suggest that Chinese title retention clauses are not merely intended as security for purchase 
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money. However still, there is a difference between extending the security beyond the 
purchase price and extending it beyond obligations arising from the contract containing the 
retention clause.  
Furthermore, guarantees, mortgages and pledges are of a strictly accessory nature under 
Chinese law (see chapter 5), and subject to a specificity principle requiring contracts to state 
the amount of money secured, apart from contracts on ‘ceiling mortgages’ or ‘ceiling 
pledges’  (which I will collectively refer to as ‘ceiling charges’). If rules on Chinese retention 
of title clauses are interpreted so liberally that they may also secure other claims between the 
contracting and/or third parties, they could easily circumvent the limitations on establishing 
security interests imposed by the Guarantee Law articles 15, 39 and 65, and the Property Law 
articles 185 and 210.  
Perhaps the strongest argument against extending title retention to other claims is the 
principle of accessoriness, clearly stated for mortgages in the Property Law article 192. 
Article 192 not only stipulates that the mortgage right “may not be independently transferred” 
and therefore is inseparably connected to a specified, underlying claim, but also that it cannot 
be “used as security for another claim”.151 The purpose of title retention clauses is shared 
with mortgages, pledges etc., namely securing a transaction. Therefore, the retention of title 
rules should not be interpreted so that they undermine the bearing principles of Chinese 
security interest law, although title retention clauses are not “security interests” (“担保”) 
according to the legal definition in the Guarantee Law article 2 (2).  
Moreover, the abovementioned rule on 75 percent payment of the purchase price precluding 
the seller’s right to repossession should imply that 75 percent payment, let alone 100 percent, 
would have the courts dismiss repossession on the grounds of other, unpaid claims. 
In conclusion, retention of title schemes such as Konzernvorbehalt and 
Kontokurrentvorbehalt would have little support in the statutes and be thoroughly 
inconsistent with basic principles of Chinese security interest law, and therefore inadvisable 
                                                
151 The LexisNexis translation “used as a guarantee for other obligee’s rights” is inaccurate in two respects. 
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as security against a buyer’s insolvency. Where the seller is insolvent, one cannot take for 
granted that a buyer would have to return movables bought with an alleged extended 
retention of title clause, if the seller’s claims arising from the purchase itself were fulfilled. 
Retention of assets for sale or improvement: Verlängerte Eigentumsvorbehalt 
The other category of extended title retention clauses safeguards the seller’s retained 
ownership in situations where he might otherwise have lost ownership under a simple 
retention clause. One variant, the Vorausabtrenungsklausel, lets the original, secured seller 
acquire his buyer’s rights as a seller against a third-party buyer in a subsequent sale.152 
Alternatively, the original seller could by means of a weitergeleitete Eigentumsvorbehalt 
impose on his buyer to include a title retention clause in the subsequent sales contract with 
the third-party buyer in such a manner that the original seller could enforce his right towards 
the second buyer.153 Chinese statutory law does not explicitly recognise such schemes, and 
whereas the German rules on these title retentions have been developed in the judiciary 
branch, there seems to be no mention of the matter in Chinese judicial interpretations or 
guiding cases.  
For such clauses to be necessary, the law must dictate that a seller loses his ownership upon 
subsequent sale between the original buyer and a third party, or upon the asset being 
processed, commingled or combined with another asset. Sales are regulated by the Property 
Law articles 106 and 108 on bona fide purchase, and the Sales Contract Interpretation article 
36 (2) explicitly dictates that a subsequent bona fide purchaser prevails over the original 
seller in a title retention sale. 
The question remains as to the processing or commingling with other assets. The Chinese 
statutes are remarkably silent on this point, though there is widespread consensus that 
property rights in such assets are lost. The reason is this: Although Chinese law does not 
provide specific conditions for when property rights are lost in these circumstances, it does 
presume that they are. The Guarantee Law Interpretation article 62 stipulates that a mortgage 
is valid and effective over payable compensation “where processing, commingling or 
processing causes ownership to pass to a third party”. Furthermore, the mortgage is under 
                                                







article 62 effective over any attached, processed or commingled assets acquired by the 
mortgagor by such means, and over the mortgagor’s share in the resulting asset where the 
above circumstances renders him a co-owner. Consequently, the article presumes that an 
asset’s processing, commingling or attachment to another asset may result in the mortgagor’s 
ownership being acquired from, lost to or shared with a third party. How to decide between 
these three results remains uncodified. 
While the statute refers to compensation arising from a lost mortgage right, the institute of 
property acquisition based on processing, commingling or combination, is general. This 
institute is known, and hereinafter referred to, as tianfu (“添附”, approximately translating to 
“addition and attachment”). The specifics of tianfu are not inferable from applicable law, and 
until further clarification from China’s legislature, I may only refer to opinions in legal theory, 
which distinguishes between the three categories combination, commingling and 
processing.154  
As for combination, Cheng maintains that where movables are combined to become an 
important part of an immovable, the movable loses its nature of economic independence and 
the ownership to it is lost, whereas ownership to the immovable expands to include the 
movable.155 He further holds that combination of two movables creates a “compound 
property” (“合成物”). If one of the assets composing this compound property can be 
considered the ‘main property’ (“主物”), in light of the assets’ value, usefulness, nature and 
common trade practices, then the owner of the main property quashes any other person’s 
ownership to the remaining assets and becomes the owner of the compound property in its 
entirety. As an example, Cheng argues that if A owns a chair and paints that chair with B’s 
paint, A becomes the owner of that paint in doing so.  
In cases of commingling or mixture, the assets are mixed to become practically inseparable. 
According to Cheng, the task is again to determine the main ingredient and holds that the 
coffee will be the main asset, and the creamer the addition,156 whereas Liang & Chen trade 
creamer for sugar.157 On the effect of commingling, Liang holds that the respective owners 
are in principle co-owners by proportion of their assets’ respective values at the time they 
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were mixed, yet that an eventual owner of a ‘main property’ should prevail. He also finds that 
the losing owner may have his loss compensated under unjust enrichment rules, and finally 
that a mortgagee retains security over any due compensation from the prevailing acquirer to 
the losing mortgagor, mortgagor’s original and acquired property, or the mortgagor’s share in 
co-owned property. 
As to processed goods, legal opinion seems also to regard the question as one of determining 
the main “part” between the physical components and the work done to them. In Cheng’s 
words, the Chinese law uses “a broad processing concept” (“广义的加工概念”), and does 
not merely include work resulting in a new product, but also work which “does not produce a 
new property, but carries more value than that of the materials”.158 
Thus, it is rather clear that an owner forfeiting possession of property, such as the seller in a 
title retention sale, incurs a risk of losing the property under Chinese law if the asset loses its 
economic identity. However, the particulars of the regulations are vague, as paper law merely 
mentions possible outcomes, and not the way to them. 
The conclusion should still be that there is an area which extended title retention clauses 
similar to verlängerte Eigentumsvorbehalt could function within. Then, the question arises: 
Would such clauses be recognised in courts? 
The first statute of the People’s Republic of China to deal with consequences of tianfu, article 
86 in the GPCL Opinions, states that where a non-owner “adds appurtenance to another 
person’s property that he uses”, and the owner agrees to the addition and “has agreed on how 
to deal with the appurtenance”, they are to be followed. If there are none and negotiations 
fails to bring about a solution, the owner may request dismantling if possible, or a return after 
conversion to money if dismantling is impossible, all while holding the non-owner liable for 
any loss. Yet, it is noteworthy that “non-owner of property” in the Chinese text is formulated 
as “非产权人”. As “产权” means ‘right to an asset’ in the broad sense, whereas ‘right in rem’ 
is “物权” as in the “物权法” or ‘Property Law’, the statute could be interpreted as merely 
recognising agreed contractual obligations arising from adding appurtenance.159 
Acknowledging clauses on proprietary aspects will often impose contractual effect on a third 
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party, at least where a third party is adding appurtenance. Still, Cheng holds that one “in the 
spirit of article 86” could recognise clauses on ownership to the asset post-process, and that 
one in the absence of a clause could give ownership to the person providing the most value to 
the new product, be it the owner of the materials or the person processing them.160 
In conclusion, it seems uncertain whether current Chinese law recognises erweiterte 
Eigentumsvorbehalt. Recognition of clauses stipulating that the buyer does not quash the 
seller’s ownership through adding appurtenance himself is perhaps less controversial than 
recognition of clauses affecting third parties, yet somewhat unclear. As the draft for the 
remainder of the future Civil Code is expected in the latter half of 2018, one may hope for 
clarification in the near future. 
4.2 Norway 
4.2.1 Retention of title or mortgage right? 
The Norwegian Security Interest Act §3-14 stipulates that “In sales of movable property, [one] 
may agree upon a security interest in the [property] sold (“salgspant”)”.  
Like Chinese retention of title clauses, Norwegian salgspant is limited to the sale of 
movables, which is natural, considering the importance given to the reliability of immovable 
property registration. Here, the common roots in German continental law result in a shared 
trust in land registers (in Germany referred to as der öffentliche Glaube des Grundbuches). 
Neither does the general rule in Norwegian Security Interest Act §3-15 extend to registrable 
movables, such as ships, motorvehicles and aircrafts, governed by special rules. 
Whereas the Chinese Contract Law refers to actual retention of ownership similar to German 
Eigentumsvorbehalt, the Norwegian Security Interest Act § 3-14 refers to retention of a right 
more similar to a Chinese mortgage, retaining only a security interest while passing 
ownership on to the purchaser. This is apparent from the wording “security interest” 
(“panterett”) which under Norwegian law does not imply any ownership for the holder. The 
parenthesised term “salgspant” literally translates to “security interest for sales”, not unlike 
the “purchase money security interest” known in US law. The UCC article 9-103 on the 







purchase money security interest is in fact an accurate equivalent, due to its purpose. The 
Norwegian Security Interest Act provides that salgspant in the sold good can be agreed on 
“to secure…a) the seller’s claim to the purchase money including interests and costs, or…b) 
loans that a third-party lender provides the buyer with to fully or partially pay claims under 
item a), and that the lender pays directly to the seller”.  
The provision is considerably narrower than the “price or other obligation” alternative of the 
Chinese Contract Law article 134, seemingly ruling out any extension of the Norwegian 
salgspant to other claims than the purchase money by means of the aforementioned 
Kontokurrentvorbehalt or Konzernvorbehalt. In the preparatory works to the Security Interest 
Act, the legislative committee details the history of non-possessory security in movables, 
from general recognition via gradual restriction, and to a proposed law “nearly implying a 
revival of the old generic security interests”.161 However, the committee gives a close-ended 
list of security interests in movables: 1) pledges, 2) (non-possessory) security in movables 
subject to registration, 3) floating charges for an enterprise’s stock and movable equipment 
used in the course of business, and finally 4) salgspant, which according to the committee 
“corresponds to current law’s retention of title for security purposes”. The existing 
terminology was due to the historic prohibition against non-possessory security in individual 
movables, resulting in a construction based on ownership.162 The renaming to salgspant was 
intended to reflect how the interest was indeed a security interest, and its usage was accepted 
because it only secured the purchase money and therefore did not separate more values from 
other creditors than the debtor was provided through the asset.163 The committee found that 
“this framework is restricted to securing purchase credit, and can thus only be used in relation 
to purchase of the secured asset”, and furthermore that the rules “replace the now practised 
regime of retaining ownership (…) until full payment (retention of title)”.164 The solution 
clearly rejects the German option of extending the secured claim to other claims.  
It is conceivable that contextual interpretation of the Chinese Contract Law article 134 could 
lead to a similarly narrow scope, cf. the wording “in a sales contract”, but the Norwegian 
equivalent is unambiguous: salgspant is one party’s charge over its own performance to 
secure the counterparty’s corresponding counter performance, and that alone.  
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Norwegian law goes so far as recharacterising alleged title retention clauses as security 
interest agreements. The Norwegian Security Interest Act § 3-22 stipulates that where the 
seller or third-party lender has “retained ownership to the sold goods until full payment of the 
purchase money or the loan, or a right to take it back upon default, the relationship shall be 
regarded as an agreement on salgspant”. 
This provision corresponds with US law, namely the Uniform Commercial Code article 2-
401 (1) second sentence: “Any retention or reservation by the seller of the title (property) in 
goods shipped or delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a reservation of a security 
interest”.165  
Ownership passing to the debtor appears to be a significant difference from articles 2 and 3 of 
the Bankruptcy Provisions (II), that formally label property with security interests as debtor’s 
assets, and property that the debtor has yet to obtain ownership to under a title retention 
clause as the seller’s assets. Taken literally, retention of title clauses would seem to withhold 
assets from the buyer’s bankruptcy proceedings in China altogether, whereas the Norwegian 
equivalent scheme would find the goods as debtor’s assets, albeit with a security interest. 
However, as Bufford points out, both the Chinese bankruptcy administrator’s right to rescind 
or execute sales contracts with title retention clauses and the hindrance of the 75 percent 
payment rule in reality leave such assets under bankruptcy administration. These facts 
diminish the goods’ difference from secured assets of the debtor, and so the de facto 
difference is not as absolute as it would appear. Still, the Norwegian regime only allows for 
securing the value of the purchase money, attributing any surplus to the estate. Repossession 
under title retention agreements in China does not impose a duty to attribute values exceeding 
he purchase money to the estate, unlike Chinese pledges, mortgages and liens (see chapter 5). 
In this regard, the nature of the Chinese title retention clause is closer to that of German 
continental law, whereas Norwegian salgspant owes more to its US relative; the purchase 
money security interest.  
  
                                                






4.2.2 Establisment and perfection 
Form 
Whereas the Chinese statutes on title retention do not contain any clear provisions on the 
form of the title retention clause, the Norwegian Security Interest Act § 3-17 sets a somewhat 
higher threshold for a salgspant agreement. The provision’s second paragraph, titled 
“Rettsvern” (here meaning ‘perfection’), provides that “[i]n other purchases than consumer 
purchases, salgspant must at the latest be agreed upon when the sold good is surrendered to 
the buyer”, exempting such agreements from the strict requirement of written contract for 
consumer sales, cf. first paragraph. Still, if an agreement on salgspant between professional 
“is not written, it must be confirmed in writing by one of the parties without undue delay after 
the delivery”, thereby imposing some degree of written form to ensure notoritet. As implied 
by the term “rettsvern”, the form requirement is not a condition for validity, but perfection.166 
Specification 
Furthermore, perfection of a Norwegian salgspant is also subject to a specification 
requirement, as § 3-17 (4) prescribes that the agreement “must specifically mention the things 
that the security interest shall include and the purchase price or purchase loan that it shall 
secure”. In Chinese property law, the general specificity principle is read in the definition of 
‘property rights’ (“物权”) in the Property Law article 2 (3). The current statutes on Chinese 
retention of title does not explicitly prescribe an application of the specificity principle. 
Naturally, due to the clause being part of a sales agreement, a degree of specificity is implicit, 
but the mandatory written confirmation and express duty to specify the monetary scope of the 
Norwegian salgspant are much more similar to what Chinese jurists label as ‘classic’ security 
interests; mortgages and pledges. This is unsurprising, as Norwegian salgspant is indeed one 
such ‘classic’ security interest. 
  
                                                







Another difference from title retention is how Norwegian law limits the material scope of 
salgspant. Even where any specification requirement is fulfilled in a contract that is written 
or confirmed in writing, salgspant agreements securing sale of goods intended for the buyer 
to resell prior to paying the original seller, are rendered ineffective even between the 
parties.167 Whether the second buyer acquires the property with a security interest or without 
it, is governed by § 3-15, prohibiting salgspant in “a thing that the buyer has the right to 
resell before it is paid”.  
The wording makes it clear that salgspant cannot be validly established upon assets that the 
buyer has an explicit, agreed right to resell prior to payment. However, Rt-1992-438 (GMAC) 
casts the provision’s net even wider. In short, the automobile sales company Auto Service 
A/S had purchased cars from General Motors Norge A/S, the latter having salgspant in the 
cars to secure the payment. The agreement between the parties, which also included General 
Motors’ financing company (GMAC), provided that the ownership of General Motors should 
be retained until the cars were paid, explicitly prohibiting legal disposal such as sale, 
pledging, mortgaging, etc. Still, with some reluctance on GMAC’s part, Auto Service started 
to conduct irregular sales, sometimes accepting late payment from the resale, before GMAC 
received payment for the original sale. When Auto Service later went bankrupt, GMAC 
demanded return of the vehicles, which according to the estate belonged under a bank’s 
floating charge. 
In interpreting the wording of the provision, the Supreme Court referred to the preparatory 
works’ statements: The original draft provision was formulated as prohibiting salgspant in 
“things bought with the intention of resale, if the seller had to consider this a likelihood”. 
According to the later proposition to the legislature, the final, proposed provision differed 
from the original proposition in limiting the resale rule to “instances where finished goods are 
sold to retailers of such goods with the intent of resale. Simple assembly for the buyer to 
perform, or similarly simple operations, are in this regard insufficient to regard as 
processing”.168 
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The Court found that the committee sought to modify the rules in two ways, one regarding 
the now codified processing, accession and commingling situations, the other by limiting the 
resale rule:  
“It also included cases where the buyer had no resale right versus the seller, but the 
seller had to assume the buyer to resell. The committee wanted to omit the latter cases. What 
remained was for salgspant to be forbidden in the typical resale cases (…)”.169 
In this case, however, GMAC purported that unlike an earlier case in which the resale rule 
had its origin, Rt-1963-109 (the Scooter Case), it was agreed that no resale right existed prior 
to paying GMAC for the individual vehicle. GMAC further held that the proposed law placed 
salgspant in things to be processed or incorporated before sale in higher priority than floating 
charges over stock. Since these goods were clearly intended for sale, a mere intention of 
resale could not invalidate the security interest. 
Addressing this, the Court found that the resale rule did not apply only in absence of express 
agreement on no resale right, referring to the committee’s intention as understood in the 
quote above: 
“When [the statutory text] says that salgspant cannot be agreed in things that the buyer has 
the right to resell before it is paid, it is meant to express that salgspant cannot be agreed in 
things that the buyer shall have the right to receive for sale before it is paid”. 
Furthermore, the Court found that although the law did recognise valid salgspant in things to 
be processed or incorporated before sale, it did not imply recognition in other cases. Under 
dissent (3-2), the Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s judgment, finding that GMAC’s 
salgspant was never established in the first place, thus recognising the floating charge 
holder’s right to the cars as maintained by the estate.  
In legal theory, the judgment is understood to widen the scope of the salgspant prohibition 
beyond what the wording in the Security Interest Act § 3-15 suggests. Skoghøy maintains 
that the critical question is not “whether the seller has the right to resell the goods before they 
                                                






are paid, but [rather] whether the goods are intended for resale”. He further holds as a 
precondition for invalidation that the seller “is or ought to be aware of this [intention]”.170 
This also indicates that Norwegian rejection of the German erweiterte Eigentumsvorbehalt, 
the extended title retention scheme in which the parties agree that the right remains in the 
asset irrespective of any subsequent resale or processing. 
Extending the right throughout resales makes little sense, as any intention of resale would 
render the salgspant non-existent from the outset. One could imagine a prohibition combined 
with a clause retaining title. 
Since one cannot establish salgspant in assets for resale, it makes little sense to agree that the 
interest would remain after the resale, as the salgspant never existed in the first place. One 
could imagine a contract prohibiting resale while simultaneously retaining ownership. 
However, the Norwegian Security Interest Act § 3-2 states that movables not subject to 
registration must be delivered in order to perfect any security interest in it, except where 
otherwise provided by law, cf. § 3-1. 
The Security Interest Act only exempts floating charges and salgspant as limited, statutory 
exceptions to the general prohibition. Extending the security interest to remain after a resale 
without statutory grounds would run contrary to basic rules of Norwegian security interest 
law. Hence, the salgspant would only remain if 1) the second purchaser was not in good faith 
pursuant to the Bona Fide Acquisition Act § 1 or 2) the secured object was a motor vehicle, 
ship or aircraft subject to registration, and the salgspant was registered, cf. § 4. 
As for processing and commingling, §§ 3-19 and 3-20 provide statutory rules for determining 
whether the right is lost or not, irrespective of agreements between the parties. These rules 
will be detailed below, but it is clear that Norwegian salgspant leaves no room for any such 
contractual extension as in German law on title retention. 
4.2.3 Termination 
Unlike Chinese law, which is somewhat vague on the proprietary consequences of processing, 
combination or commingling of assets under title retention or security interests, the 
                                                






Norwegian Security Interest Law gives rather clear provisions concerning these occurrences. 
The following occurences do not lead to the salgspant never having been effective as an 
intention of resale could, but instead quashes an otherwise valid security interest.  
Fulfilment of the claim 
As with Chinese mortgages (see chapter 5), the security interest ceases to exist upon payment 
of the purchase money. This is implied by § 3-15 stipulating salgspant as security for the 
price alone. Where there is no outstanding purchase money, there is nothing to secure and 
there is no room for extending salgspant to other claims. Yet, is there a similar threshold for 
enforcement as the Chinese rule of rejecting repossession rights after 75 percent payment?  
The Norwegian Enforcement Act chapters 8 and 9 allow for satisfaction of claims secured by 
salgspant either by forced sale or by, as a creditor would under a Chinese title retention sale, 
repossessing the asset. Before a 2010 revision, the Norwegian Enforcement Act § 9-1 on such 
repossession referred to conditions in the now repealed Norwegian Credit Purchase Act § 15. 
The provision prohibited repossessing salgspant security unless “a) at least 1/10 of the credit 
purchase price or at least two instalments or the remaining debt has not been paid one month 
after it was due” or “b) the purchaser exposes the security to considerable risk”. After a 2010 
revision, the Enforcement Act § 9-1 instead refers to the Financial Contract Act §52 and its 
conditions for debt maturing prior to the agreed term which, among others, include situations 
in the Security Interest Act § 1-9 that would mature the secured debt. They generally concern 
“material breach” of the credit agreement, insolvency, abuse of possession and other 
circumstances infringing upon the value of the security. What constitutes a material breach is 
a question under the law of obligations, but it is worth noting that current Norwegian law 
seemingly does not impose a specific minimum percentage of outstanding debt for 
repossession to be possible. 
Combination and commingling 
In contrast, loss of security interest due to reworking or combining the asset with another may 
leave the creditor with next to nothing if such loss happens prior to payment. As for 
combination and commingling (“sammenføyning” refers to both, as it means physical 






lost when the asset is combined with “immovable property another main object” in “such a 
manner that separation would lead to disproportional expenses or unreasonable loss of 
value”. 
What Skoghøy calls “a natural economic unit”, i.e. where one part is useless in lack of the 
other, is insufficient. 171 The reference to “another main object” resembles the theoretical 
approach to tianfu under Chinese law, where the assessment of which object is the “main 
object” decides which party acquires another’s right. Where co-ownership (or similar 
coexistence of rights) is not an alternative, this approach is unsurprising. But whereas 
Chinese legal theory seems to hold shared interests as an alternative, Norwegian salgspant 
will either remain or be quashed. According to Skoghøy,172 something is a main object where 
it would be regarded as such under the Incidental Ownership Act § 3, with reference to the 
preparatory works presuming the acts to be “in principal compliance” with one another.173 He 
formulates the point as whether the alleged main object “can be identified in the new object 
and constitute the most significant element of it”. This corresponds with Cheng and Liang’s 
theories on identifying the main object (“主物”) in compound (“合成物”) property under 
Chinese law. The security interest is quashed where the expense is “disproportional” or the 
loss “unreasonable”, two tresholds open to interpretation, demanding clarification beyond 
what the statute provides. 
In Rt-1991-909 (the Brown Order), the Appeals Selection Committee of the Supreme Court 
found that “costs that would be incurred also if the salgspant was invoked before the 
combination, shall not be regarded”. The Appeals Selection Committee agreed with the High 
Court that “it is primarily physical damage and loss falls in under the term ‘loss of value’, not 
that the separate values of the main object and the part together are worth less than the value 
of them united”. The High Court had found that the question of unreasonable loss had to 
relate to the costs of disassembling and removing secured parts incorporated into the main 
object in question (here: excavators), as well as the costs of incorporating new parts. While 
unable under procedural rules to scrutinise the concrete assessment of whether the threshold 
“unreasonable” was passed, the Appeals Selection Committee did not find the interpretation 
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incorrect and thus accepted that i.e. costs of transporting the goods to the holder of the 
salgspant and delivery costs for new parts had to be disregarded.174 
The terms “expenses” and “loss” can overlap, and the fact that they must be “disproportional” 
or “unreasonable” does, from a linguistic interpretation suggest that the amounts must 
reasonable or proportionate compared to something else. It is therefore believed that the 
amounts must be compared to the value of the object, and Skoghøy finds that costs of 100 
000 kroner will not be sufficient for loss of salgspant if the secured asset holds a value of 5 
million kroner. Yet, in a commentary to the act, he suggests that the threshold is also relative 
to whether the secured creditor knew of the incorporation, as does Konow.175 The same 
consensus applies to the opinion that both losses and expenses must be regarded in a final, 
overall assessment of whether the detrimental effects are to result in loss of salgspant, also 
where the security interest concerns several assets.176 
Processing or improvement 
Another instance when Norwegian law might quash security is after the debtor has processed 
or added to the asset. Under the Security Interest Act § 3-20, salgspant is lost where there “by 
processing or addition has taken place a not insignificant change in the sold good’s nature or 
value after being handed over to the buyer”. The wording implies that both reworking and 
simply improving can lead to this change in nature, and that change of nature and value are 
alternative causes for loss. This interpretation complies with the intentions apparent in the 
preparatory works,177 where the committee found reason to tighten the rule following two 
widely cited cases mentioned below. Whereas the judgments had upheld change of nature and 
value as cumulative conditions, the committee found that “one on this point should tighten 
the conditions for the salgspant to remain: ‘not insignificant change in the sold good’s value’ 
and ‘not insignificant change in the sold goods nature’ should be alternative causes of loss”.  
That would have reversed the verdict in Rt-1996-857 (the Piglet Case), where the prolonged 
feeding of piglets had increased their value, though not their nature. In the older Rt-1955-209 
(Vågå Bruk), the processing of timber had altered its nature and its value, and the relation 
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between the two conditions was no determining factor. But giving “an exact rule about how 
big the change must be” was in the committee’s opinion “hardly appropriate”, and therefore 
left to the courts’ discretion. One should however note that the wording “not insignificant” 
indicates a middle ground between “insignificant” and “significant”, and that the threshold 
might not be insurmountably high. The wording “by processing or addition” also, as Konow 
points out,178 requires a causal link between the change and the work on the asset so that 
“inflation or market related circumstances” does not terminate the right. There are also 
examples of this causal requirement in court practice, such as Rt-1990-128 (the Smolt Order) 
where the High Court found that otherwise improved smolt was still under salgspant as the 
value had not increased due to a lower market price. The Supreme Court’s Appeals Selection 
Committee, constrastingly, found this to be incorrect, as “the crucial point is, in the 
committee’s opinion, whether the additions have increased the value not insignificantly 
compared to its value without these additions”. Furthermore, it could not be a determining 
factor that the price was not higher “due to the market crashing in the meantime”. 
Both positive or negative changes in value may result in loss. The preparatory works use the 
example of steel cutting for fitting onto a ship’s hull as an example, finding that although the 
processing of the steel would decrease its value rather than increase it, “one changes the 
nature of the steel as an object of sale by cutting it”. In the legislators’ opinion, this ought to 
lead in loss of the security interest. 179 
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5 Security interests: When are 
debtor’s assets not part of the estate? 
5.1 Backdrop and outline 
The question of whether the insolvent party has ownership to an asset is only a starting point 
for answering whether an asset is part of the estate. Under Chinese law, this is evident when 
one sees the Bankruptcy Provisions (II) article 3 in connection with the Chinese Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law article 109. Under the Provisions’ article 3, the courts “shall identify 
specific assets upon which the debtor has legally established a security interest as debtor’s 
assets”, while the Law article 109 prescribes how “right holders enjoying security interests to 
debtor’s specific property enjoy a right to preferential payment from such specific property”. 
According to the Bankruptcy Provisions (II) article 6, bankruptcy costs and mutual benefit 
claims may only be satisfied through any “remaining part” (“剩余部分”) of secured property 
after the security is realised or terminated. The Norwegian Security Interest Act § 1-1 
stipulates that “a security interest” (“panterett”) is a “separate right to seek satisfaction for a 
claim (the secured claim) in one or more specific assets (the security)”. Both jurisdictions’ 
laws imply that although the asset is owned by the insolvent debtor, its proceeds cannot 
satisfy unsecured creditors’ claims before paying off secured claims to creditors with existing 
security interests in that particular asset.  
Thus, security interest rules are as significant to ascertaining the estate’s scope as the rules on 
transfer of ownership. This chapter investigates circumstances under which the estate must 
recognise a security interest that allegedly withholds some value of the debtor’s property 
from the estate.  
It is unsurprising that pledges are recognised security interests in China and Norway,180 as 
both the German Pfandrecht and the common-law ‘pledge’ largely concern the same right. 
Most jurisdictions have a variant of pledges, and their regulations are largely similar;181 
enforceability generally relies on possession. Mortgages, however, are more revealing to 
differing considerations, raising the question of which mechanisms safeguard verifiability 
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and public notice in lieu of possession, and is a more practical security where the debtor and 
the creditor are located in different countries. 
Liens are practical where large-scale machinery is subject to maintenance, and while this 
thesis covers liens over non-registrable movables, the subject itself has a close connection to 
the maritime sector, an industry with a strong Sino-Norwegian connection. As Norway and 
China diverge on the implications of a lien, it is of interest to the comparison.  
This chapter will therefore only detail mortgages and liens, omitting contractually agreed 
possessory security interests (pledges). For a general overview over security applicable to 
movables, the properties they may relate to and their perfection, please refer to Appendix A. 
Yet, a comprehensive account of all aspects concerning mortgages and liens can hardly be 
given adequately in this chapter. Therefore, it will merely concern certain essentials: The 
requirements for mortgages’ protection against the estate, the extent at which their scope may 
fluctuate from the time of establishment until bankruptcy, whether priority rules affect the 
estate’s rights, and lastly; when the mortgage terminates. Before this, I will briefly examine 
the implications of a lien, albeit without detailing the liens’ lifespan, as the focus is instead on 
how the security differs between China and Norway in terms of its legal nature. 
5.2 The nature of liens 
The term ‘lien’ holds different connotations in different jurisdictions. In the UK, the term 
‘lien’182 merely refers to a non-consensual, possessory right to retain the debtor’s assets to 
provoke payment (a retention right).183 In the US, ‘lien’ is a generic term for collateral in 
general. ‘Non-consensual liens’, such as carrier’s liens184 or mechanic’s liens applied by 
some states, are closer equivalents to the British concept, albeit with an implied right to 
forced sale. 
The Chinese Property Law article 230 gives the possessor a right to withhold possession of 
the debtor’s goods, a ‘lien’ (“留置权”). If one of the parties is not a business, article 231 
requires the possession to arise from the “same legal relationship” (“同一法律关系”) as the 
                                                
182 At least the ‘common-law lien’, as opposed to the ‘equitable lien’, cf. McCormack, pp. 44–45. 
183 See i.e. Bridge, p. 170: “a passive right to retain a chattel (…) conferred by law”, and Gullifer in Beale et. al., 
p. 75. 






debt. Yet, in business between enterprises, the creditor may also utilise possession arising 
from an unrelated relationship to the debtor. However, the Chinese lien is not a mere 
retention right, as article 230 gives the creditor a right to “seek preferential payment” (“有权
就该动产优先受偿”) from the movable, and entitles him to its fruits (“孳息”). Under article 
236, the possessing creditors may monetise the property in agreement with the debtor, or seek 
preferential payments through a sale or auction. This sales right differs from the mere 
retention right of i.e. England, and more resembles a pledge in effect. The difference from a 
pledge is that the possession was not obtained for security with the debtor’s consent. The 
sales right is restricted under article 236. If there is no clear agreement on a specific 
redemption period, the debtor may repay within two months, unless the goods are “difficult to 
keep” (“不易保管”). 
In Norway, various statutes stipulate a retention right (“retensjonsrett” or “tilbakeholdsrett”), 
such as the Maritime Act § 54, the Carriage of Goods by Road Act § 20 (3) and Artisan 
Services Act § 46, giving the creditor in possession of a defaulting debtor’s goods the right to 
withhold the goods. However, these are codified examples of a general, non-statutory 
retention right.185 Skoghøy maintains three basic requirements, namely that the claim secured 
“must be due”, that the retaining party “must have possession of the goods” and lastly that 
there is some degree of “connectivity between the claim and the possession”.186 So far, the 
Chinese liens differ only concerning the third requirement, as they do not require the same 
legal connectivity between claim and possession in professional transactions. 
However, the effects of a lien are somewhat different, as a Norwegian lien does not 
automatically imply a right to sell the property, and merely lets the creditor retain it, such as 
in England. Yet, there are far-reaching exceptions. One is an artisan’s right to sell unretrieved 
goods under the Right to Sale of Unretrieved Goods Act §§1 to 5. If relevant court 
proceedings are decided, the Act gives a sales right when the claim is at least three months 
due, the work is finished, and the creditor has encouraged the debtor to pay and release the 
lien and informed him of the alternative being forced sale. The procedure somewhat 
resembles the redemption period under the Chinese Property Law article 236, which requires 
the creditor to negotiate fulfilment terms or wait two months. 
                                                
185 I.e. Rt-2006-1348 (Østlandske Autoberging) and Skoghøy 2014, p. 281. 






Other exceptions to the lack of sales right under Norwegian law are, according to Skoghøy, 
sales due to some degree of emergency, i.e. where the goods are perishable or decrease in 
value187 or continued retention is costly or “especially burdening”.188 
In addition, the Enforcement Act § 7-16 allows the retaining creditor to obtain distraint over 
the property to realise the claim, such as in Rt-1923-113 (Kubben). The latter case, 
concerning a maritime lien, acknowledged that such distraint would take priority over 
competing security interests and enabled realisation. Skoghøy takes the case as representative 
of a general rule; upon obtaining distraint in the retained asset, the distraint assumes the lien’s 
priority and the lienee may sell the asset, effectively combining the retention right with a 
sales right.189  
Considering these exceptions, Norwegian liens will often offer the creditor a similar position 
as under Chinese law. Yet, China has a default rule resembling the US non-consensual liens, 
whereas Norway share with England the notion of mere retention as the default right, 
notwithstanding deviations in special statutes or certain areas of law. 
5.3 Mortgages 
5.3.1 General overview 
Mortgages 
Here, ‘mortgages’ refer to contractually established non-possessory charges over property; 
the secured creditor may satisfy his claim through certain property of the debtor, with the 
asset still in the debtor’s possession. 
Some jurisdictions may take mortgages to imply transfer of ownership to the mortgagee.190 
The Norwegian Security Interest Act § 1-1 defines the term (in Norwegian called 
“underpant”) as “a security interest where the disposal is not taken from the owner”, it is 
clear that the debtor holds both possession and legal ownership. The same applies to China, 
                                                
187 Rt-1907-359 (Hver 8de Dag) 
188 Rt-1896-321 
189 Skoghøy 2014, p. 299. 
190 I.e. the English ‘legal mortgage’, cf. Gullifer in Beale et. al., pp. 83–84. In this chapter, a ‘mortgage’ refers to 






where the Property Law article 186 forbids agreements from prescribing that “ownership of 
the mortgaged property shall be attributed to the creditor when the debtor fails to pay his due 
debts” if such agreement is made before the debt is due. Thus, Norwegian mortgages 
(“underpant”) and Chinese mortgages (“抵押”) refer to the same concept. Neither mortgage 
equivalent implies a lex commissoria rule of claiming ownership upon default, and 
corresponds more to a civil law hypothec, English ‘charge’ or mortgage of US states taking a 
‘lien theory’ approach to mortgages. 
While mortgages are often created over rights to land and other immovable property, the 
Chinese Property Law article 180 also accepts mortgages over movables, such as 
“manufacturing facilities, raw materials, semi-manufactured goods and finished products”, 
“vessels and aircrafts under construction”, “means of communication and transportation” and 
“other property not prohibited from mortgaging”. Article 184 codifies such prohibitions, 
listing land ownership due to being state property, land rights owned by the collectives where 
they are not exempt by law, and properties with unclear or disputed ownership or right to use, 
confiscated, seized and supervised property.  
Perhaps more significant is the provision’s prohibition of mortgaging schools, kindergartens, 
hospitals and other “facilities” (“设施”) of institutions or social groups for public benefit. The 
Chinese wording for “facilities”, “设施”, encompasses movables and immovables alike, and 
any financing of such property must be secured by other means, such as financial leasing or, 
perhaps, retention of title. The effect of title retention financing would resemble that of 
mortgages: The creditors’ satisfaction through such movables would have detrimental effects 
to the public interest. The statutes on title retention clauses only reject clauses over 
immovables, and contain no explicit prohibition on certain movables. Moreover, the 
Guarantee Law Interpretation article 53 stipulates that where such welfare undertakings 
mortgage assets “other than” (“…以外的财产”) the ones referred to in the statutes to obtain 
credit, the court “may consider the mortgage valid” (“人民法院可以认定抵押有效”). Still, 
the law does not indicate where to draw the line.  
On the other hand, the purpose of title retention and mortgages is largely the same, as are the 
potential consequences to the public. While a similar prohibition of title retention to public 






at present. I will not detail further whether title retention is possible for public welfare 
facilities, and the Draft Civil Code might provide some clarification in late 2018.  
Compared with China, Norway takes a more restricted approach to non-possessory security 
interests. The Norwegian scepticism to far-reaching non-possessory security interests for 
private persons is apparent in several respects. First, there is the prohibition in § 1-4 (1) 
against security interests encompassing “all that someone owns or will own”, a rule dating 
back to the Security Interest Act of 1857.191 The various preparatory works detail the reasons 
for such limitations, and tend to emphasise the importance of available assets for involuntary 
creditors such as tort creditors and tax authorities, as their opportunities to secure claims are 
fewer.192  
While Norway historically banned non-possessory security in movables, necessitating a title 
retention scheme, current law is more lenient in allowing non-possessory security in the form 
of salgspant in singular movables.193 Still, as the Chinese Property Law article 180 further 
provides that movables permitted for mortgaging “may be mortgaged together”, Norwegian 
salgspant remains more rigid in both scope and purpose, and does not correspond to the 
Chinese mortgage. As for mortgaging goods collectively, Norwegian law only recognises 
such schemes under a floating charge. As non-possessory security without title retention is 
unavailable for movables in Germany,194 both Norway and China diverge from the countries’ 
Germanic influences, although Norwegian law does so to a lesser degree. 
Floating charges 
While normal mortgages refer to security over specific objects, floating charges 
(“varelagerpant”, “driftstilbehørspant” or more generally, “virksomhetspant” or 
“tingsinnbegrepspant” in Norwegian, “浮动抵押” in Chinese) refer to certain legal subjects 
mortgaging classes of assets without specifying individual assets or their overall amount, an 
English common-law invention195 adopted by China in the Property Law of 2007. The 
Chinese Property Law article 181 stipulates that “an operator of an enterprise, individually 
                                                
191 Cf. Rådsegn 8, p. 29. 
192 For a concise summary: Ot.prp. nr. 26, p. 161. 
193 See i.e. Konow, p. 61, also noting exceptional singular mortgaging of certain goods in the Norwegian 
Security Interest Act § 3-8. 
194 Retention of title or transfer of title for security (“Sicherungsübereignung”) are the only alternatives, cf. 
Konow, p. 61 and pp. 120–133.  






owned business or agricultural manufacturing business” may mortgage “manufacturing 
facilities, raw materials, semi-manufacture goods and finished product currently owned or to 
be owned in the future”. Similarly, the Norwegian Security Interest Act § 3-4 allows only for 
“businesses enterprises” to create non-possessory security interests on “operating accessories” 
(“driftstilbehør”) that are “used in or designated for their business operations”. Such 
accessories includes movables such as “machines, implements, tools, furnishings and other 
equipment”, in addition to certain immaterial rights and exploitation rights, cf. §3-4 (2). This 
“operating accessory mortgage” (“driftstilbehørspant”) is subject to somewhat different rules 
from the alternative “stock mortgage” (“varelagerpant”) for “stocks of goods used in the 
business” under  § 3-11, which relates to “raw materials, unfinished and finished goods and 
merchandise”, “fuels and other consumables” as well as “packaging for the products of the 
enterprise”. In addition, there are several specific equivalents for motor vehicles and 
construction machinery (§ 3-8), agriculture (§ 3-9) and fisheries (§3-11) that will not be 
detailed further.  
These goods share the feature of being necessary to business operation, thus making it 
inconvenient if possible to pledge them while continuing operations. This is also an important 
reason for the floating charges’ invention and adoption.196 Norwegian preparatory works 
emphasise how such goods through economic development have come to constitute ever-
larger parts of an enterprise’s total assets, thus necessitating raising significant capital: “The 
need for credit can in such cases be large, and securing such credit may come with serious 
problems”.197 Similar factors were key elements behind China’s expansion of mortgages in 
the Chinese Property Law, which introduced the floating charge. Williams & Lu hold that 
state owned enterprises “had much easier access to banks and financial markets than non-
state, non-listed firms”, and that small and medium sized enterprises’ most valuable assets 
were often unsuited for pledging, resulting in such enterprises often resorting to the unofficial 
debt market.198 Hence, making assets of small and medium sized enterprises (‘SME’s’) 
available as security became a priority that “would hopefully allow SME’s greater access to 
the formal banking sector and thereby bolster economic growth and development”.199 
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However, these reasons apply primarily to commerce, and it is therefore unsurprising that 
floating charges are available exclusively to business enterprises under both Norwegian and 
Chinese law. 
While Norwegian law divides general floating charges into two categories,200 operating 
accessories and stock, their statutory contents are rather similar to the scope of the Chinese 
floating charge, securing both production equipment and products at any point in the 
production process. Operating accessories and stock alike must be mortgaged “in their 
entirety” under §§ 3-4 (5) and § 3-11 (3) respectively, yet with the reservations that one may 
mortgage separate parts of stock that appear as independent units, and that businesses with 
separately managed departments may mortgage one department’s goods alone.201 
The implication of Norwegian floating charges’ division mainly concerns the debtor’s right to 
disposal: Under § 3-7, one may only replace or transfer operating accessories “in accordance 
with proper operation”, and may not “considerably reduce” the mortgagee’s security. Stock 
goods “may be freely transferred” within the debtor’s “normal business operations”. The 
Norwegian floating charges cover the relevant equipment pool of the enterprise or 
department, or the stock in trade or relevant part of such stock, “in its entirety, as it is at any 
time”. Where the enterprise sells property under the floating charge in accordance with 
normal or proper operation pursuant to the conditions above202 and the buyer obtains 
perfection (see sub-chapter 3.3.3), the floating charge no longer includes said property.  
The Chinese statutes do not draw a similar line, although breaches of either criterion under 
Norwegian law could potentially fulfil the conditions for ‘crystallisation’ of the Chinese 
floating charge pursuant to the Chinese Property Law article 196. This ‘crystallisation’ (“结
晶” in Chinese)203 denotes the event turning the unspecific floating charge to a fixed charge 
over specific assets.204 Article 196 stipulates crystallisation upon 1) expiration of payment 
terms, 2) the mortgagor being “declared bankrupt or dissolved” (“被宣告破产或者被撤消”), 
3) contractually agreed circumstances for realisation of the mortgage or 4) “any other 
                                                
200 Certain charges specific for fisheries and agriculture also exist. 
201 The arbitration case RG-1987-140 details the conditions’ application. 
202 These conditions are different from one another, yet both relative to the nature of the business, and are not 
detailed here. For an overview: Skoghøy 2014, pp. 225–229. 
203 Cheng in Wang et. al., p. 476. 






circumstance seriously impacting the realisation of the claim” (“严重影响债权实现的其他
情形”). Improper transfer of the property could presumably concern the lattermost criterion.  
The general rule of the estate’s satisfaction right in the Norwegian Creditors Recovery Act § 
2-2 refers to debtor’s property at the time bankruptcy was declared, cf. § 1-4 (3). Thus, the 
floating charge affixes to relevant property not yet transferred prior to bankruptcy 
declaration.  
However, the Chinese Enterprise Bankruptcy Law chapter 8 prescribes a corporate rescue 
scheme called “bankruptcy reorganisation” (“破产重整”), under which the bankruptcy 
administrator, or the insolvent debtor under the administrator’s supervision, continues 
business operations while enforcement is stayed against the debtor. The scheme resembles 
the reorganisation of the US Bankruptcy Code Chapter 11, in particular where the court 
allows the debtor to operate the reorganising business (‘debtor-in-possession’),205 and the 
English scheme where the administrator operates it.206 
This raises the question of whether Chinese floating charges may automatically crystallise 
prior to bankruptcy declaration, so that the creditor has fixed charges to all equipment or 
stock during reorganisation. 
It is clear that article 196 (2) on crystallisation upon bankruptcy declaration or dissolution 
does not apply to reorganisation, as the Chinese Enterprise Bankruptcy Law article 78 
stipulates that the court may terminate reorganisation and declare the debtor bankrupt, 
implying that bankruptcy declaration is a later event. The parties might agree upon 
insolvency or near-insolvency as a crystallisation event under the Chinese Property Law 
article 196 (3), but it can hardly be deduced as a default rule, as that would make transfer of 
equipment or stock subject to the creditor’s consent under article 191, which could impair the 
reorganisation’s goal of regaining solvency. Furthermore, the Chinese Enterprise Bankruptcy 
Law article 75 prescribes that “exercise” (“行使”) of security over “specific assets” (“特定财
产”) is “suspended” (“暂停行使”) during reorganisation, indicating an intention of debtor’s 
assets being available for business. One could restrict these assets and obtain post-insolvency 
financing by providing new security under the Chinese Enterprise Bankruptcy Law article 75 
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(2), which allows the administrator to provide security for new debt, but as insolvent 
enterprises tend to have total debt exceeding the value of available assets, obtaining adequate 
financing would be difficult. The reasonable conclusion therefore seems to be that floating 
charges continue to fluctuate unless the circumstances “significantly impact” the prospect of 
realisation under the Chinese Property Law article 196 (4). That would also correspond with 
the automatic stay in the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, which allows the court to lift a stay on 
security interests “where it is possible that the security property may suffer damage or 
obvious decrease in value” (“担保物权有损坏或者价值明显减少的可能”). 
5.3.2 Establishment and perfection 
Establishment and perfection of a security interest are two different concepts. Establishment 
refers to creating an effective right protected between the contracting parties. Perfection is the 
act of giving this right protection against third parties. When this sub-chapter addresses these 
events concurrently, it is due to how Norwegian and Chinese approaches differ in protection 
of security interests:  
As this analysis will show, the parties have wide discretion and few restrictions on how to 
establish a valid mortgage in Norway. More restrictive are the conditions for third-party 
protection, as security is generally unenforceable against the estate without an additional 
action of perfection aimed at providing the legal relationship with a degree of notoritet and 
public notice. China sets out stricter requirements for the security interest to exist, but once it 
is established, additional perfection requirements relate only to protection against bona fide 
acquisition, whereas even unperfected security is effective against the estate. 
Where the requirements are not met, the secured creditor loses to the estate under either 
jurisdiction, yet for different reasons: In China, the creditor has no security interest at all. In 
the Norwegian relativist approach, the creditor has a security interest in the property against 
the debtor himself, yet no enforceable right against the estate as a third party.  
Legal grounds 
A first problem is on what legal grounds a mortgage contract may be established. One may 






The Norwegian Security Interest Act § 1-2 (2) prescribes that “security interests established 
by contracts” can only be “validly established” pursuant to the Act or “other statutory 
provision”. This rule, often referred to as ‘the legality principle of security interest law’, 
dictates contractual invalidity where the contract establishes a security interest over an asset 
that is not permitted as an object to security interests by statute, or the relevant contractual 
requirements for such security are not adhered to. The Chinese Property Law articles 170 and 
180 take another approach, permitting security interests in general “unless otherwise provided 
by law” and normal mortgages for certain properties as well as “other property not prohibited 
from being mortgaged”. That does not mean that all security interests are applicable where no 
specific prohibiton exists. Floating charges are under article 181 reserved for certain 
movables. Yet, the Norwegian function of the principle of legality as requiring explicit 
mention in statutes for an object to be valid security, does not correspond to the Chinese 
legislation.  
The Norwegian wording “validly established” implies that breach of the legality principle not 
only renders the security interest unenforceable against third parties, but ineffective between 
the contracting parties.207 This is similar to the effect of mortgage agreements on objects 
prohibited from mortgaging under the Chinese Property Law article 184. The Guarantee Law 
Interpretation 53 states that property of public welfare institutions other than that intended for 
public welfare “may be considered valid”, and presumes the alternative to be invalidity.  
Form requirements 
In China, any pledge or mortgage contract must be concluded in “written form” (“书面形式
”) or “written agreement” (“书面协议”), cf. the Chinese Property Law articles 185 and 210, 
cf. articles 202 and 222. Article 172 dictates that the “establishment” of the charge 
presupposes that the contract is “concluded in accordance with this law and other laws”, 
implying that where form requirements are not adhered to, no valid right exists. One may see 
this as a safeguard for the specificity principle, which is as present in security interests as in 
property rights generally. Only when the scope of agreement is clear, does the legal 
relationship lend itself to adequate scrutiny, either from an estate investigating the 
relationship’s legitimacy or from creditors examining the unoccupied margin between the 
                                                






asset’s value and the scope of existing security to evaluate the risk of taking second-priority 
security in the asset.208 
For the mortgage contract to comply with the law, it should also “general” (“一般”) specify 
categories and amounts of the secured claims, payment terms, the monetary scope of security 
as well as property’s quantity, quality, location, ownership or use right attributions. However, 
the wording “general” indicates that the specification requirement is relative. One 
modification is how a floating charge contract cannot specify the amounts of secured 
property or the specific assets covered. Another is how the Chinese Property Law article 203 
allows for a debtor or a third party to establish ceiling mortgages (“最高额抵押权” literally: 
“maximum amount mortgage”) or ceiling pledges (“最高额质押权”, literally: “maximum 
amount pledge”), allowing the parties to secure consecutively arising debt within a specified 
maximum amount. Here, specification of the monetary scope of security applies only to the 
stated maximum. Unless a payment term is agreed, the law applies a default rule of the 
creditor’s entitlement to request confirmation two years after establishment, cf. article 206 (2). 
Furthermore, article 185’s predecessor in the Guarantee Law article 39 stipulated that the 
contract “shall” specify the aforementioned variables, yet held that omissions “may be 
amended” (“可以补正”). Furthermore, the Guarantee Law article 56 allows for 
supplementing “the main types of credits secured or the mortgaged property” from 
obligations of the underlying contract, yet deems the mortgage “not to have been established” 
(“不成力”) where that is impossible.209 This demonstrates that although the specification 
requirement is a relative one, it is a condition for validity. 
Norway, contrastingly, does not generally prescribe form requirements for contractual 
security in movable property. Thus, in the relationship inter partes, freedom of form remains. 
Enforceability is rather a question of perfection. The only remaining non-possessory security 
interests in movables are floating charges. Under the Security Interest Act §§ 3-6 and 3-12, 
these are subject to registration, presupposing submission of written forms to the registry. 
Nonetheless, floating charges remain effective between the parties without registration, and 
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finding written form to be a condition for a security interest’s existence over movables would 
therefore be inaccurate.   
Specification 
As to specification, the Norwegian Security Interest Act § 1-1 defines a security interest as a 
right to satisfaction in “one or several specific assets”. Moreover, § 1-4 prescribes that a 
security interest “only obtains perfection when a specific amount or a maximum amount has 
been specified for the secured claim, unless otherwise provided by this Act”, with an 
exception for additional claims such as costs and interests under § 1-5. 
Together, these statutes demonstrate the two aspects of the Norwegian specificity principle in 
security interests: Specification of the security object and specification of the monetary scope 
of security. Skoghøy notes that the reason for the specificity principle is twofold. One 
purpose is to avoid creditor fraud by providing notoritet, the other is to facilitate security 
interests on secondary priority.210 The latter is addressed in the preparatory works for a legal 
revision: “He who lends on secondary priority ought to know what principal claim he will 
have to yield for”.211 
However, only the specification of claims is generally a condition for perfection. Yet, as 
Skoghøy notes, the fact that only the scope of security aspect is expressed article in § 1-4 
“does not mean that the first aspect of the specificity principle is abandoned”. The reason is 
rather that floating charges specify the objects themselves, without letting the parties agree 
otherwise.212 
As under Chinese law, specification of the security object is not a strict requirement for 
Norwegian floating charges under § 3-4 and § 3-11. Before realisation, the security interest 
relates to the classes of property, not individually specified property or amounts. The 
specificity principle takes on another form: Even though the floating charge covers the 
relevant pool of assets “in its entirety”, the options of limiting the floating charge to a specific 
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part of storage or the assets of one department imply that one must instead specify the 
relevant asset pool (storage part or department). 213 
Another possible difference relates to the Norwegian principle’s effect. The wording “only 
obtains perfection” (“rettsvern”) refers to third-party protection, not validity, and suggests 
that lack of specification of claims does not preclude contractual validity between the 
contracting parties. Moreover, the preparatory works arising from revision of the Security 
Interest Act state that “§ 1-4 first paragraph is a perfection rule. It poses a requirement of 
specifying the secured claim as a condition for perfection”.214 In the proposition for the 
Security Interest Act, the preparatory works state that the “the condition of specifying the 
secured object (…) is in the draft a validity requirement”, whereas “the condition of 
specifying a maximum amount (…) only relates to perfection”.215 The asset specification rule 
referred, the current Act’s § 1-3, prohibits the debtor from placing all current and future 
property as collateral. Skoghøy holds that even validity of security contracts relating to 
singular assets must rely on specification, by extension of § 1-3.216 However, he himself 
admits that there can hardly be form requirements for such specification, unless the law 
provides otherwise. This is mainly a pledge related concern, as the only non-possessory 
contractual security interest to individualised movables is salgspant, where the sales contract 
specifies the property. 
The Norwegian Security Interest Act § 1-2 (4) states that when a security interest “obtains 
perfection under this act”, it “does not preclude acquisition of rights pursuant to [the Bona 
Fide Acquisition Act] unless otherwise provided by law”. The implicit meaning is that 
perfection of rights under the Act refers to protection against the owner’s creditors. Expressed 
differently, the creditors constitute the third party against which protection is acquired. As the 
creditors in a bankruptcy estate are considered third parties, as previously discussed under 
sub-chapter 3.3,217 perfection is a precondition for asserting the security interest in 
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bankruptcy liquidation.218 In such cases, a valid security that does not satisfy specification 
requirements is hardly worth more than were it invalid, as inter partes effect does not extend 
to the estate. Due to its limited implications to bankruptcy proceedings, I will not detail the 
question of specification as a condition for validity further. 
Perfection requirements beyond the contract 
The discussion above warrants the question of what requirements exist beyond an adequate 
contract for a mortgagee to enjoy protection against the estate. As mentioned in chapter 4, 
several acts may perfect a contractually acquired property right, if any action beyond 
concluding the contract is at all required. For security interests, the way to ensure legal 
protection will depend upon the nature of the right. These acts aim at providing some degree 
of public notice (“公示”, or ‘publicity’, “publisitet”) and, according to Norwegian legal 
theory, notoritet. 
However, the legal effect of such acts may vary. Chinese property law has a dualist approach 
of two different doctrines. The “validity upon publicity doctrine” (“公示生效主义”) takes the 
action of publicity as a requirement for a property right to be valid. The “validity upon 
publicity” doctrine is not only the general rule for property rights pursuant to the Chinese 
Property Law article 9, but also appears in mortgage rights to immovables, stipulating that the 
right is “established” upon registration. This is not a mere question of third-party protection; 
without registration, there is no valid security interest at all.219 
Contrastingly, the “opposability upon publicity doctrine” (“公示对抗主义”) recognises the 
right to property as effective prior to the action of publicity, yet requires the action of 
publicity as a measure for protection against bona fide third parties.220 Rights to registrable 
movables, such as ownership to vehicles, vessels and aircrafts under article 24, as well as 
mortgages over any movable under article 188, are all subject to the “opposability upon 
publicity doctrine”. Security interests attach to them already at the time of contractual effect, 
rendering registration voluntary. However, if such voluntary registration of the mortgage has 
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219 The Chinese Property Law article 188. The same applies to pledges, as delivery establishes the pledge, cf. 
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pledges includes the time of delivery, cf. article 210 (5). 






not happened, the mortgagee may not oppose any “bona fide third party” (“善意第三人”), cf. 
article 188. The same applies to floating charges under article 181. That certainly leaves the 
creditor at risk of losing the asset to a bona fide acquirer, as regulated in articles 106 and 108 
of the Law, but the more pressing question regarding insolvency is whether the secured 
creditor would also lose to the unsecured creditors in the bankruptcy estate. 
One could regard the unsecured creditors in a bankruptcy estate as third parties in the sense of 
not being parties to the contract. Furthermore, their interests are often of a tertiary nature, 
converging with neither the debtor’s nor the secured creditors’. Bobrow et. al. hold that 
“[a]lthough not expressly stated in either the Bankruptcy Law or the Property Law, the 
Chinese Bankruptcy Administrator would likely be recognised as a bona fide third party for 
the purpose of avoiding unperfected security interests”. As I read their account, Bobrow et. 
al. do not refer to the avoidance rules as such, but to the implied authority of an administrator 
to confiscate property under an unperfected security interest. There are weighty arguments 
for their interpretation: The right to separation entailed by a security interest is a useful means 
of withholding assets from the estate, and harbours a risk of creditor fraud. A lack of 
registration requirements for non-possessory security enables antedating of mortgage 
agreements. Nevertheless, the interpretation is not entirely convincing, as it gives rise to 
several problems: 
Primarily, it undermines the Chinese dichotomy of validity vs. opposability upon publicity, as 
a valid but unregistered mortgage would be as unenforceable as an invalid one. The purpose 
of a mortgage is to seek preferential payment to mortgaged property in case of default, so if 
the unsecured creditors constituted a third party under article 188, any unregistered mortgage 
would be ineffective in a bankruptcy. The obligatory right to payment exists without regard 
to the existence of a security interest, and the advantage of securing the obligation is the 
recourse to preferential payment. As ‘preferential’ payment presumes that there exist 
competing interests that the secured creditor is preferred to, it would make little sense to 
regard the mortgage as valid if any unsecured creditor could prevail over the security interest. 
Due to the explicit statement that the mortgage of a movable is valid without registration, 
which is the essence of the “opposability upon publicity doctrine”, identifying the estate with 






Second, the statutes on opposability upon publicity, namely article 129 for contractual 
management of land, article 158 for easements and articles 188 and 180 for movables, all use 
the term “bona fide third party”. As Werthwein notes, this indicates that the law “only refers 
to such a third party whose good faith is legally relevant”.221 Estate creditors, contrastingly, 
do not need to be in good faith concerning other interests in the asset. 
Third, the bona fide acquisition rule protects the party that has achieved a property right after 
relying on the transferor’s apparent authority to dispose of a given property. The unsecured 
creditors in the estate do not hold property rights, but obligatory rights. In a legal system with 
a numerus clausus principle, one might discuss if one can then speak of conflicting interests 
in the property itself, which is the situation that the statutes appear to address. Cheng holds 
that “…the so-called ‘third party’ as in ‘bona fide third party’ should be limited to people 
enjoying a property right to the property in question, and does not include general creditors. 
When it comes to creditors’ rights and unregistered mortgage rights, there cannot be a 
conflict, as the rights are not of the same nature”.222 In Cheng’s view, the possible third 
parties with property rights include acquirers of ownership, unregistered mortgagees, and 
others enjoying “some other right of a proprietary nature” to the movable, such as lessees 
etc.223 While Werthwein disagrees with Cheng on the lessee, there is some consensus on the 
conflicting right having to be proprietary, thus excluding unsecured bankruptcy creditors.224  
Recent legislation points even further in this direction. In late 2016, the Supreme People’s 
Court issued the Property Law Interpretation. It explicitly states in article 6 that for 
unregistered property rights to motor vehicles, vessels and aircrafts under article 24, the bona 
fide third party shall not include the transferor’s creditors (“转让人的债权人”). This 
excludes unsecured creditors’ rights from prevailing in the movables most closely associated 
with registration, as even ownership acquisition to such movables follow the “opposability 
upon publicity doctrine”, unlike the more lenient rules for other movables discussed under 
sub-chapter 3.2.1. Strictly speaking, the Supreme People’s Court only opined on “bona fide 
third party” in transfer of ownership to these particular movables. Still, this indicates how the 
                                                
221 Werthwein in Bu (ed.), p. 205. He does not specifically refer to bankruptcy estates, but discusses whether a 
lessee is a “third party”. The point remains the same: reference to good faith suggests bona fide acquisition. 
222 Cheng in Wang et. al., p. 458.  
223 Ibid. 
224 See also Liang & Chen, p. 50, specifically mentioning the mortgagee’s implied right to separation to the 






Court interprets the “opposability upon publicity doctrine” as establishing property rights 
effective against creditors already upon contractual conclusion. This is a sound argument for 
protection against unsecured estate creditors even when the mortgage of a movable is 
unregistered. 
Moreover, article 199 takes proportion as the basis of priority between concurrent, 
unregistered mortgages, presupposing the effectivity of mortgages in absence of registration. 
If unregistered secured creditors are to share the property, it makes little sense to rank any 
unsecured creditor above them. 
In conclusion, the voluntary registration seems to aim at protection against bona fide 
acquisition, and it appears likely that the mortgage agreement alone should be sufficient to 
protect the mortgaged movable against the unsecured creditors in the estate. Yet, as the law is 
unclear on this matter, and the risk of bona fide acquisition remains, registration is certainly 
the safest course of action for the cautious creditor. 
In Norway, the perfection rules are clear-cut and notably strict: A salgspant, as explained 
under sub-chapter 4.2.2, has perfection if the agreement was concluded at the time of delivery 
or prior to that time pursuant to § 3-17. Floating charges over operating equipment or stock 
are perfected upon registration pursuant to §§ 3-6 and 3-12. Unlike in China, lack of 
perfection not only exposes the creditor to the risk of bona fide purchasers, but to extinctive 
acquisition of the estate, which does not require the creditors of the estate to be in good faith. 
While this may suggest a more lenient approach in China, the formal conditions for 
contractual establishment are stricter. The qualitative requirements for a contract maintain 
some degree of scrutiny, though mostly concerning what Norwegian lawyers would call 
notoritet, and even so with a risk of contracting parties colluding to alter the contract. Public 
notice is far more prominent with regards to immovables, where lack of registration implies 
the same unenforceability as under Norwegian law, and even inter partes validity is generally 
only obtainable through registration. 
5.3.3 Priority 
Priority rules refer to the order of existing security interests. As the mere existence of a 






important to whether a Chinese estate may confiscate the property.225 As to ceiling mortgages 
and ceiling pledges, article 205 provides that one may not use one’s priority to increase the 
secured debt at the expense of other creditors with security in the same asset without their 
consent. Moreover, the determination of debt rule in article 206 (see sub-chapter 5.3.4) 
hinders the debtor from increasing the debt during bankruptcy proceedings at the expense of 
the unsecured creditors of the estate. By implication, the parties must be free to increase the 
debt at the expense of unsecured creditors as long as the determination circumstances have 
yet to occur. 
Also in Norway, priority rules concern mainly the internal distribution between secured 
creditors, as the estate may generally seize values under unperfected security. The priority 
between security interests over the same asset is prescribed in § 1-13, which applies the first-
in-time principle so that “the right first attached ranks first, unless otherwise agreed or 
provided by the rules on perfection”. The term “attached” (“påheftet”) refers to the time of 
establishment, not perfection. As the exceptions refer to protection against the unsecured 
creditors, it normally does not determine priority between security interests.226 In other 
words, where both the claim and the security interest securing it exist, the right takes priority 
over subsequently established rights, regardless of perfection. 
However, as perfection is a condition for estate creditors having to respect the security 
interest, as well as the explicit reservation for perfection rules in § 1-13, any secured creditor 
having a first priority right to satisfaction is of little concern to the estate unless that priority 
is perfected. Skoghøy summarises the implication concisely: “One may thus say that an 
unperfected security interest protects against reluctance to pay, yet not against insolvency”.227 
Yet, under certain circumstances, the order of priority may be of consequence to the estate’s 
right to satisfaction. These conflicts are too manifold and relative to circumstance to detail in 
this account, but generally arise where the estate may assume the position of the first-ranking 
creditor, but the lower-ranking creditors have protection against the estate. The reason is the 
general rule that outranked creditors may, unless otherwise agreed, assume higher priority 
                                                
225 Similarly: Liang & Chen, p. 284: “(…) mortgagees may all seek preferential payments from the sale 
proceeds of the same asset before the general creditors, irrespective of priority order”. 
226 Skoghøy 2014, p. 197. 






when the higher priority security interest or claim is fulfilled or terminated.228 Still, this rule 
does not apply where the senior creditor secures new claims under the original security,229 
where the estate redeems a senior claim under the Creditors Recovery Act § 8-16, or where 
the estate voids a senior security interest.230 Another exception to the promotion rule is where 
the debtor retained a right to establish another security interest on senior priority. If that right 
is unused upon bankruptcy, it “belongs to the debtor” and the estate may assume that right.231  
5.3.4 Fluctuation 
Increase of the secured claim 
Despite the specificity principle, the scope of a mortgage may fluctuate from establishment to 
realisation, in this case bankruptcy liquidation. 
As implied by the ceiling mortgages of Chinese law and the formulation “specific amount or 
maximum amount” in the Norwegian Security Interest Act § 1-4, the specification of the 
secured amount does not necessarily reflect the current debt owed to the creditor. 
Naturally, repayment may reduce the debt secured by the collateral. As the purpose of a 
security interest is to satisfy the debt secured, it could be natural to assume the scope of 
security to decrease along the scope of debt, yet that is not necessarily the case.  
Chinese security interests are generally accessory to the underlying claim. This is implied by 
the statements in the Chinese Property Law article 172 that a security interest contract “shall 
be subordinate to the principal contract” and that an invalid claim renders attached security 
invalid, and in the stipulation in article 177 (1) that a security interest “terminates” (“消灭”) 
upon “the principal claim terminating”. Yet, article 203 on ceiling charges permits the parties 
to agree only upon a maximum amount within which the secured debt may fluctuate until the 
                                                
228 See Skoghøy 2014, p. 202 and casuistic provisions in the Housing Cooperatives Act § 6-9 and the Aviation 
Act § 3-29. 
229 Skoghøy 2014, p. 203. 
230 NOU 1972:20, p. 295, Falkanger & Falkanger, p. 815 and Skoghøy 2014, p. 205. Less certain: so-called 
‘triangular priority conflicts’ (“trekantede prioritetskonflikter”), i.e. where the senior creditor has a lien by 
attachment (lacking protection against the estate, cf. the Civil Procedure Act § 33-7), and the second-ranking 
contractual secured creditor has perfected his right against the estate. Such triangular conflicts’ solutions are 
disputed and relative to the cause of conflict. For detailed accounts: Skoghøy 2014, pp. 217–220, Steinkjer, pp. 
160–175 and Berg, pp. 28–41. 






occurrence of certain circumstances prescribed under article 206. These circumstances 
confirm the debt secured, and happens upon expiration of an agreed term of credit or a 
default period of two years from establishment, when it is clear that new credit is “unlikely to 
arise” (“不可能发生”), when the security is “confiscated or seized” (“被查封, 押扣”), when 
the debtor or creditor “is declared bankrupt or dissolved” (“被宣告破产或者被撤销”), or 
upon other circumstances prescribed in law.  
Before then, the debts may fluctuate within the set maximum and the parties may alter this 
maximum, any agreed terms and the included claims with the consent of other creditors with 
security in the same assets or insofar as it does not adversely affect them, cf. article 205. This 
presupposes two deviations from the specificity principle:  
First, the scope of security remains at the maximum even as outstanding debt decreases. 
Second, one may incur new debt within the margin between current debt and the property 
value where the latter exceeds the former. Naturally, the property may only satisfy total 
secured debt under the ceiling mortgage at the time of realisation, as article 198 prescribes 
that “any excess proceeds from cashing, auction or sale of mortgaged property beyond 
amount of claims, shall be attributed to the mortgagor, while any shortfall shall be settled by 
the debtor”.  
Under article 203, “claims existing prior to establishment of the ceiling mortgage may, with 
consent from the parties concerned, be incorporated into the scope of claims under the ceiling 
mortgage”. The term “incorporated” (“转入”) in connection with “prior to the establishment” 
(“设立前”) seemingly holds the agreement on a ceiling charge as an establishment of a 
separate right, suggesting both that the ceiling mortgage can hardly assume the priority of a 
previous, registered secured claim incorporated into it and that security for fluctuating debt 
must be established as just that. This also seems more coherent with the general accessoriness 
principle, as it would hardly be a representative principle if deviation were the default rule. 
Another implication is that only ceiling charges can be established independently of the claim 
existence. 
Contrarily, Norwegian mortgages allow for relending under the original security by default. 
In practice, relending may happen under a mortgage for a maximum amount without 






panteobligasjoner”). Marthinussen takes this practice as a clear example of the mortgage 
being somewhat independent of the original underlying claim, and cites the case Rt-1994-775 
(Yousuf), in which the Supreme Court found that the priority of such mortgages is 
determined by time of perfection.232 This, he argues, indicates how “the Norwegian security 
interest is independent with regards to establishment”, meaning that the mortgage right can 
exist and obtain perfection prior to the claim, a practice with longstanding recognition of the 
courts (i.e. Rt-1909-117 (Løvlie) and Rt-1910-177 (Halvorsen)).233 Another implication is 
that the parties may agree to secure increasing or new claims within the agreed maximum or 
exceeding scope. Like Marthinussen, Lilleholt sees this as Norwegian security interests being 
abstract “in the sense that the security interest can secure shifting and varying claims”.234 The 
effect is rather similar to Chinese ceiling charges, yet the right is general, and exists by 
default. 
However, such relending schemes are restricted in both jurisdictions. The Chinese Property 
Law article 205 limits alterations to the specified maximum, so that they may only take place 
before final confirmation of the debt under the mortgage or pledge, and without adverse 
effects to other creditors with security in the same asset, unless such creditors consent to the 
alteration. As alterations are under such restrictions, it appears questionable to assume that 
one may establish a ceiling collateral in assets to which other secured creditors have an 
interest, so long as the value of the asset does not exceed the total sum of secured debts or 
other creditors have consented to the ceiling collateral arrangement.   
A similar concern for competing mortgagees is evident in the Norwegian Yousuf Case: 
Although bank A had a mortgage on first priority in the asset, bank B had established a 
mortgage ranking second only to the originally secured amounts. Subsequently, bank A and 
the debtor agreed to increase the secured amount from 125 000 NOK to 300 000 NOK. The 
Supreme Court found that it would be a “breach of the principle of loyalty that must be 
between competing right holders, if [the debtor] were to do this at the expenses of the priority 
assigned to the subsequent mortgagee”. Although the relending right existed prior to the 
second mortgage, the court considered bank A’s subsequent increase disloyal, finding bank A 
to have known of debtor’s agreement with B for B only to rank behind the original amount. 
                                                
232 Marthinussen 2010, p. 281. 
233 For a detailed account: Marthinussen 2010, chapter 14. 






The Chinese reorganisation institute raise a similar question for ceiling charges as for floating 
charges; is the debt confirmed already upon initiation of reorganisation proceedings?  
Seeing as declaration of bankruptcy is the statutory limit for fluctuation, it again seems that 
the scope of the charge, this time concerning the secured claim, fluctuates until bankruptcy or 
contractually agreed circumstances. While it would be unfair to other creditors for the 
mortgagee to relend post-bankruptcy, the reorganisation system requires refinancing 
measures, and utilising existing ceiling mortgages is a convenient and fair manner of 
obtaining funds that does not unnecessarily infringe upon competing interests, as the creditor 
had protection up until the maximum amount at the outset. 
Commingling of security 
Another way a security interest may fluctuate is commingling of security with other assets. 
This may lead to one owner’s extinctive acquisition of another’s property. Where the debtor 
loses ownership, it is no longer a matter between the secured creditor and the estate, and thus 
irrelevant to this account. However, the debtor could also claim to acquire such property, 
raising the question of who obtains its value. 
For example, party A mortgages machinery to creditor B. After increasing the value of the 
machine by giving it a coat of paint, A discovers that the paint in fact was property of C. 
When A goes bankrupt, C maintains a claim to the added value. A’s estate maintains that B 
acquired the paint from C by combination, and belongs to the estate since B’s security 
interest only extends as far as the value of the uncoated machinery. B argues that the value of 
the machinery has decreased after concluding the mortgage contract so that the secured claim 
now exceeds the value of the machine in uncoated state, and equals its value in coated state. 
He therefore purports that the can exercise his mortgage over the entire machinery, as far as 
his secured claim extends.  
In China, the mechanics of tianfu (see sub-chapter 4.1.4) are essential to the solution. The 
Guarantee Law Interpretation article 62 only provides that the mortgage remains valid over 1) 
compensation payable due to third-party acquisition, and over 2) the mortgagor’s ownership 
or 3) co-ownership where he is the acquirer. The pressing question is when the result should 
be one alternative and not another. The solution remains as unclear for mortgages as for 






under the theoretical approach of finding the ‘main object’,235 the paint would presumably be 
part of the machine to which B has a mortgage right, and its value subject to the mortgage. 
Were the paint mortgaged, the security presumably terminated, although statutory law is 
unclear on this point.  
In Norway, the Norwegian Incidental Ownership Act § 3 prescribes that the owner of any 
eventual “main object” becomes the owner, similar to Chinese legal theory. In other cases, § 
2 prescribes co-ownership according to their original assets’ respective values. However, 
these rules only apply insofar as the property cannot be separated “without too large a 
damage and cost”, a standard which must weigh the expense of separation against the value 
of the asset.236 If the main object is subject to a floating charge, the charge applies to the 
relevant asset pool in its “entirety”, extending as far as the debtor’s rights to the assets. 
Therefore, B would also acquire the paint in Norway, unless it was subject to a salgspant, 
which prevails over a floating charge under the Security Interest Act § 3-4 (3), cf. § 3-11 (5). 
Yet, as the paint would be virtually inseparable, the latter situation is impractical. In other 
words, where the debtor obtains ownership through these rules, the security may remain also 
over the addition. 
5.3.5 Termination 
Several circumstances may terminate a security interest, removing the hindrance for the 
estate seizing the security. While loss of property, either by commingling, processing or bona 
fide purchase is certainly a relevant cause for termination, these circumstances also imply that 
the asset becomes non-existent or outside the debtor’s ownership sphere, thus unavailable to 
the estate. Therefore, I will not detail the rules on loss of property, but only note that where 
the asset is lost, both Chinese and Norwegian security interests are often substitutive, so that 
the security may remain over the debtor’s insurance or proceeds obtained in connection with 
the loss.237 Below, I will discuss causes for termination that may result in the estate’s seizure 
of values. 
                                                
235 See sub-chapter 4.1.4. 
236 See sub-chapter 4.2.3 concerning salgspant. 
237 The Norwegian Insurance Contract Act §§ 7-1 (3) and 7-5 entitle secured creditors to insurance of registrable 
movables and movables under floating charges by default, and secured creditors in other situations upon 
agreement. For details corcerning rights to insurance and sales proceeds: Skoghøy 2014, p. 257. The Chinese 
Property Law article 174 entitles secured creditors to insurance, proceeds or compensation obtained from the 







Termination upon realising the security interest, cf. the Chinese Property Law aticle 177 (2) 
and the Norwegian Enforcement Act § 8-17 (2) for forced sale and § 9-10 (1) for 
repossession is self-explanatory: after satisfying the claim through the security, the right has 
served its purpose and ceases to exist.  
Another is expiration of the claim, which leads to simultaneous termination of a Chinese 
mortgage under the Chinese Property Law article 202, but probably applies as a general rule 
pursuant to article 177 (1) on termination of the claim.238 Contrariwise, the Norwegian 
Limitation of Action Act § 27 (3) prescribes that collateral does not expire with the claim, 
unless in two cases: One is salgspant, which expires concurrently with the claim under §27 
(2) and independently one year after the claim or last instalment was due and five years after 
delivery under the Norwegian Security Interest Act § 3-21 (1). The other is mortgages for 
unspecified debt that is not for “intended credit”,239 but for contingent debt arising from 
events outside the parties’ control, i.e. tort claims, cf. the Norwegian Limitation of Action 
Act § 27 (1) b). This is another instance of Norwegian security being independent from the 
claim, although salgspant remains strictly accessory. 
The Chinese accessory principle further implies that payment terminates the security interest, 
cf. the Property Law article 177 and the Guarantee Law articles 52, 74 and 88 (2). However, 
ceiling mortgages and pledges allow for relending, so partial fulfilment does not quash these 
security interests, as implied by the wording “for debt to be incurred”.  
Again, Norwegian security interests differ, and while Skoghøy generally maintains that a 
collateral right terminates “if the claim it is to secure, is settled”,240 there are modifications to 
this statement. One is the Financial Contract Act § 70 (1), which prescribes that a third-party 
guarantor’s settlement of debt allows the settlor to assume the secured creditor position, 
which Skoghøy holds as evidence of the collateral terminating only when there is no recourse 
right against the debtor.241 One could say that “the claim it is to secure” is now another. In 
                                                
238 Similarly: Liang & Chen, pp. 320 and 345 and probably Cheng in Wang et. al., p. 450, although his account 
seems unclear on whether a two-year extension in the Guarantee Law Interpretation 12 now abolished for 
mortgages still applies to liens and pledges. In my opinion, the development towards strict accessoriness 
suggests that it does not. 
239 In the words of Skoghøy 2014, p. 256. 
240 Ibid., p. 253. 






this situation, the Chinese Property Law article 176 prescribes that the creditor shall instead 
realise the claim, rendering the guarantee a secondary remedy.  
Relending under original security presupposes the security has continued existence at least 
after partial payment. Marthinussen finds that even full repayment should not terminate the 
collateral right, unless the underlying relationship displays a clear intention of such 
termination,242 with reference to Rt-1895-721, where party A settled the debt of party B 
without recourse while acquiring the mortgage bond, which was reused with the Supreme 
Court’s later approval. Marthinussen also cites the Financial Contract Act § 6,243 on the 
creditor’s duty to delete or release the security for settled claims “unless otherwise agreed in 
connection with the settlement”. Thus, Norwegian security interests do not necessarily 
terminate upon payment; contractual interpretation is necessary. 
Norwegian rules on contract law terminate the security where the creditor waives the 
security.244 Where the creditor waives the claim, it is again a matter of contractual 
interpretation whether the waiver applies to security also.245 The Chinese Property Law 
articles 177 (3) and 194, explicitly cites the creditor waiving security as a cause for 
termination of a mortgage, and the accessoriness implied in article 177 (1) on termination of 
claims must apply similarly where the claim is waived. 
                                                
242 Marthinussen 2010, pp. 340–343. 
243 Ibid., p. 343. 







6 Comparative summary 
The above chapters have compared the determining legal factors for ascertaining the scope of 
Norwegian and Chinese bankruptcy estates. The two jurisdictions’ shared roots in German 
continental law could make it reasonable to assume that their laws on property transfer and 
secured transactions would roughly correspond to that of the German BGB, yet the 
comparison shows otherwise.  
Between Norway and China, China seems to be the most mindful of German requirements 
for transfer of ownership, differing only on consequences on contractual invalidity, whereas 
Norwegian conditions for transfer of property are highly dependent on circumstance. Instead 
of finding ‘the owner’, Norwegian lawyers assess the individual right’s degree of third-party 
protection.  
The principles for determining whether an insolvent buyer’s estate may seize assets are not 
too different; both China and Norway apply a right to halt and repossess goods in transit. 
However, when deciding whether this right is lost, China refers to generally applicable rules 
on delivery by possession or limited surrogates, whereas the Norwegian stoppage right’s 
criterion “handed over” is somewhat relative to the type of sale.  
Where the seller is insolvent, delivery is required in China, albeit with the traditional three 
exceptions to the delivery principle allowing for indirect possession. Norwegian law is 
somewhat unclear on whether it adheres by Germanic law. While Brækhus & Hærem’s 
interest doctrine does not correspond to constitutum possessorium, the general belief in a 
delivery requirement is closely associated with the German roots that inspired Chinese law. 
Yet, the Norwegian dogma has at times favoured the agreement principle, and Hauge has 
recently argued that relevant legal sources can very well prescribe such an approach. In any 
case, the consensus she opposes is at least a testament to German law’s currency as 
inspiration for Norwegian property law, a common denominator with the Chinese legislative 
outlook.  
In both jurisdictions, retention of title or salgspant rules supplement the transfer of property 
rules, and as neither Chinese retention of title nor Norwegian salgspant require acts of 






creditors. They also share a common purpose of, at least primarily, securing the purchase 
money. 
Yet in other respects, the Norwegian purchase money security interest salgspant is not a true 
equivalent to neither Chinese nor German retention of title, as it is in essence a non-
possessory security interest that does not retain ownership. It seems highly improbable that 
the difference between salgspant clauses and title retention clauses can be anything more 
than nominal under Norwegian law: It was the legislature’s explicit intention to replace title 
retention with salgspant. The resulting recharacterisation rule imposes the same statutory 
restrictions regardless of what the parties named the clause, be it salgspant or title retention. 
Since these restrictions limit the secured claim to the purchase money, nullify salgspant in 
assets for resale and give mandatory rules on whether processing or commingling results in 
loss of rights, extended title retention clauses cannot be recognised. As to the effect of the 
salgspant, the buyer would be as unauthorised to sell or pledge the property under § 3-16 as 
would a non-owner, and the seller can realise the interest by either forced sale or repossession. 
In short: permissible acts under salgspant are achievable under Chinese title retention. What 
is only be achievable under extended title retention in Germany, is forbidden under 
Norwegian law. Effectively, title retention as something more than salgspant ought therefore 
to be impossible under the Norwegian Security Interest Act. However, it seems probable that 
similar restrictions apply in China. 
Causes for termination of salgspant, largely converge with the theoretical approaches to the 
Chinese tianfu rules, although the latter appear more uncertain due to scarcer legal grounds, 
and a natural point for future codification. Norwegian law has several statutes on the matter, 
but the use of general standards leaves a fair bit of discretion to the judicature, making 
applicable case law all the more relevant. 
In terms of legal nature, salgspant is rather Norway’s closest equivalent to Chinese 
mortgages over singular movables, as Norwegian law is otherwise restrictive with non-
possessory security interests in movable property. In terms of formation, specification and 
effect, the two countries’ legislative approaches to security interests quite resemble one 
another. Salgspant resembles the US purchase money security interest, and the rules in the 






Norwegian securitisation, although China partially adheres to German legal thought, namely 
Eigentumsvorbehalt, on the point of securing purchase money. 
Yet, whereas both countries have drawn upon common law for their security interests, 
Chinese recognition of non-possessory security in singular movables to secure obligations 
beyond purchase money leaves Norwegian law somewhat closer to the Germanic scepticism 
to non-possessory security. Moreover, the Chinese lien’s implied sales right has more in 
common with the American liens (as a general, proprietary security) than the mere retention 
right implied by possessory liens in Norway and England.  
Norway and China’s shared reluctance towards the most generic security interests has led to 
some modification of the floating charge through limiting its scope through specification, and 
where other jurisdictions may allow all current and future assets to serve as security, China 
and Norway reserve such schemes for certain movable property. Still, its introduction is in 
itself an appropriation of common law. The Chinese appropriation extends also to the 
bankruptcy reorganisation scheme. 
A common metaphor for China’s reconciliation of market economy and socialism is that of 
pragmatic reformer Deng Xiaoping, architect of the ‘reform and opening up policy’:  
“It does not matter whether it is a black cat or a white cat; if it catches mice, it is a 
good cat”.  
This pragmatism also applies to both jurisdictions’ legislative outlook: In the larger picture, 
both Norway and China display an eclectic and utilitarian approach to limiting a bankruptcy 
estate. This utilitarian attitude results in hybrid property laws less concerned with adherence 
to concepts of their Germanic civil law roots than accommodating increasing needs for credit 
in two markets that have rapidly developed within half a century. Yet, both jurisdictions seem 
reluctant to give the market full autonomy at the expense of public or third-party interests. 
This is reflected in Norway’s prohibition against all-encompassing security interests, in part 
motivated by concern for tax authorities and other involuntary creditors. It is also apparent in 
the strict requirements for obtaining legal protection against third parties in property 
acquisition, safeguarding the need for verifying the transaction’s legitimacy and contents. 
China prohibits mortgaging public welfare facilities and attributes land ownership to the 






Both countries address credit needs through wide arrays of security interest and title retention 
schemes. Opposing interests of unsecured or involuntary creditors and the public are 
protected through scepticism towards legal protection from contractual conclusion alone and 
restricting the scope of the most unspecific security interests; the floating charges. Many have 
pointed out Chinese legislative pragmatism in the area of civil and commercial law. Chen 
points out a trend that Chinese legislators “are becoming more open-minded by borrowing 
from the legislative experiences of both civil law and common-law countries, and also from 
those of mixed jurisdictions”.246  
This comparison has demonstrated how Norway and China are often similar in this respect, 
and indicated some uncertainties that are interesting subjects of comparison when China 
presents its Draft Civil Code in the latter half of 2018.  
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Provisions of the Supreme 
People’s Court on Certain 
Issues Concerning the 
Application of the Enterprise 
Bankruptcy Law of the 
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Opinions of the Supreme 
People’s Court on Certain 
Issues Concerning the 
Implementation of the 
General Principles of the 
Civil Law of the People’s 

















Judicial Interpretation of the 
Supreme People’s Court on 
Certain Issues Concerning the 
Application of the Guarantee 
Law of the People’s Republic 
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to Act 7 June 1935 no. 2 on registration and to certain other acts / Innst. O. 
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Appendix: Overview over security interests 
Note: The table below displays general, contractual security interests that are applicable to 
movables in general, in addition to liens, which are not created directly by contract, yet (in 
















that has legal 
possession of 
an asset of the 
“debtor”  
(CPL art. 230) 
General: Movables to which the 
creditor has legal possession under 
the same legal relationship 
Between two enterprises: Movables to 
which the creditor has legal 
possession under any legal 
relationship (CPL arts. 230 and 231) 
Established by 
operation of law when 
the debtor fails to pay 
due debt 
(CPL art. 230) 
Movables the lien 
of which is 
prohibited by law 







Any debtor Any creditor 
Movables, unless otherwise 
prescribed by law, according to 
Skoghøy, pp. 282–283. Sandvik, 
Krüger & Giertsen, p. 414 hold it as 
uncertain whether immovables can be 
covered. Skoghøy holds that such 
coverage must be prescribed in 
statutes 
Established by 
operation of law when 
the debtor fails to pay 
due debt in a legal 
relationship connected 
to the possession, 
according to Sandvik, 
Krüger & Giertsen, pp. 
414–417. Yet, they and 
Skoghøy all find that 
the courts must 
exercise discretion and 
reject liens that are 
unfairly coercive, cf. 
op.cit., p. 416–417 and 
Skoghøy, pp. 291–293 
The rule is unclear, 
yet it seems that 
immovables should 
at least be 
prescribed 
statutorily to be 









(CPL art. 208) 
Movables (CPL art. 208) 
Established and 
perfected upon delivery 
(CPL art. 212) 
Movables of which 
pledging is 




The following rights: 
1. Draft, cheques, cashier’s cheques 
2. Bonds, deposit receipts 
3. Warehouse receipts, bills of lading 
4.Transferable fund units and equity 
5. Property rights in transferable 
exclusive trademark rights, patent 
rights, copyrights, etc. 
6. Accounts receivable 
7. Other property rights*(CPL art. 
223) 
Established upon 
delivery of title 
certificate, or upon 
registration if there is 
no title certificate 
(CPL art. 224) 
Property rights for 
which pledging is 












pledge Any debtor Any creditor 
Non-registrable movables or 
accessories to registrable movables 




















and right of 
disposal to 
the object  
(CPL arts. 
179 and 180) 
Any “creditor” 
(CPL arts. 179 
and 180) 
Buildings, objects attached to the land 




(CPL art. 187) 
1. Land ownership 
2. Cultivated land, 
residential sites, 
hilly land set aside 
for private use, etc. 
for which the use 
right is owned by 
the collective, apart 
from exceptions 
prescribed by law 
3. Public welfare 
facilities 
4. Property with 






6.Other property of 
which mortgaging 




(CPL art. 184) 
Construction land use rights (CPL art. 
180 (2)) 
Contractual land operating rights of 
land such as barren land, etc. acquired 
through invitation to tender, auction, 
public consultation, etc. 
(CPL art. 180 (3)) 
Buildings under construction (CPL 
art. 180 (5)) 
Manufacturing facilities, raw 
materials, semi-manufactured goods, 
finished products 
(CPL art. 180 (4)) 
Established upon 
effective contract. 
Perfected against bona 
fide third party upon 
voluntary registration 
(CPL art. 188) 
Vessels and aircrafts under 
construction 
(CPL art. 180 (5)) 
Means of communication and 
transportation 
(CPL art. 180 (6)) 
Other properties not prohibited from 
being mortgaged by any law or 
















(CPL art. 181) 
Manufacturing facilities, raw 
materials, semi-manufactured goods, 
finished products currently owned or 
to be owned in the future  
(CPL art. 181) 
Norwegian 
mortgage Any debtor Any creditor 
Rights to immovable property 






Interest Act § 2-5) 
Property not 
mentioned in the 
Norwegian 
Security Interest 










Registrable movable property and 
accessories to such property 






Interest Act § 3-3 (1)) 
Property not 
mentioned in the 
Norwegian 
Security Interest 









Motor vehicles, movable construction 
machinery and railway vehicles used 
in or intended for business operations 






Interest Act § 3-8 (2)) 
Property not 
mentioned in the 
Norwegian 
Security Interest 
Act § 3-8. 
Norwegian 
salgspant 













Interest Act § 
3-14) 
Sold movable property (Norwegian 
Security Interest Act § 3-14) or sold 
accessories to registrable movables (§ 




agreement confirmed in 
writing by a party, 
perfected by delivery 
after such confirmation 
(Norwegian Security 




Act § 3-14) and 
registrable 
movables (§ 3-15). 
Motor vehicles are 
not prohibited from 
salgspant as they 
are not registered 
in an asset register 
(“realregister”) but 
a personal register, 
cf. § 1-1 (4). Yet, 
the salgspant must 
be registered in this 
personal register 
for perfection. 
2. Movables for 
resale prior to 





written agreement and 
subsequent delivery 
(Norwegian Security 













Operating accessories used in or 
designated for debtor’s business 
operations, including:  
1. Machines, implements, tools, 
furnishings and other equipment, 
certain intellectual property rights and 
exploration rights (Norwegian 
Security Interest Act § 3-4 (1)) 
2. Motor vehicles, movable 
construction machinery and railway 
vehicles (§3-8) 
3. Movables for agricultural use (§3-
9) 
4. Movables used for business 





Interest Act §§ 3-6, 3-8 
(2), 3-9 (3) and 3-
10(2)) 
Property not 
mentioned in the 
Norwegian 
Security Interest 
Act §§ 3-4, 3-8, 3-










§§ 3-11 (1)) 
Any creditor 
Stock in trade, including raw 
materials, unfinished and finished 
goods, fuel and other goods consumed 
in the course of business and 
packaging for the enterprise’s 
products (Norwegian Security Interest 





Interest Act § 3-12 (1)) 
Property not 
mentioned in the 
Norwegian 
Security Interest 
Act § 3-11 
 
